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Compliance is a core concern for corporate governance.  Firms devote 
tremendous amounts of money, personnel, and attention to ensure 
compliance with regulatory mandates, and yet compliance failures 
proliferate.  This is because the current static and binary view of 
compliance hinders both efficient compliance by firms and effective 
regulation by government.  Understanding the reality that compliance is 
both dynamic and driven by efficiency empowers firms to evolve past mere 
conformance and into wealth maximizing innovation.  This Article 
develops an efficient investment-risk (EIR) model of compliance that 
captures the tradeoffs between cost and risk, parses the oft-commingled 
concepts of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, and enables firms 
to obtain a competitive advantage through compliance.  We also turn our 
attention to regulators and highlight how the EIR model can enhance 
regulatory design, foster regulator-firm cooperation, and advance the 
mutual goals of business and society. 
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INTRODUCTION
This is a critical time for the study of compliance.  Corporate and 
regulatory compliance, which consists of the internal processes that firms 
use to ensure that their employees do not violate applicable laws and 
regulations,1 has become big business.  The stakes for firms are high.  Costs 
associated with compliance are as high as $10,000 per employee and 
impose multi-billion dollar expenditures.2  Regulation of business 
continues to grow unabated,3 particularly in heavily regulated industries, 
 1.  GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND 
COMPLIANCE 3, 137 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2014). 
 2.  See W. Mark Crain & Nicole V. Crain, The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. 
Economy, Manufacturing and Small Business, NAT’L ASS’N. OF MFRS. 1 (2014) 
http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/Cost-of-Federal-Regulations/Federal-Regulation-
Full-Study.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/EF8Y-YMZ3] (reporting the quantified costs of 
regulatory compliance on firms). 
 3.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRAFT 2015
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 8 (Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2015_cb/draft_2015_cost_benef
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such as health care and financial services.4  Compliance staffing has rapidly 
increased, and firms are allocating extensive resources towards managing 
the compliance function.5  The only thing more costly than compliance is 
non-compliance, with a survey of firms revealing that the cost of non-
compliance is more than double the price of following the rules.6  It is little 
wonder why fifty-eight percent of compliance officers wake up in the 
middle of the night worrying about work.7
With so much at stake, and with such great resources allocated, why 
do so many firms still fail to comply with legal rules? The usual suspects—
bad actors, an unethical business culture, and compromised regulators—are 
surely present.  However, failures to comply still occur in environments 
where bad actors are few, the culture is conducive, and regulators are not 
particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.  Even though a new industry 
in corporate compliance has sprung up,8 it is unclear whether simply 
spending more money on compliance necessarily produces a more 
compliant enterprise.9  While company investments in compliance often 
lead to perceptible benefits,10 many firms are struggling with the rapidly 
it_report.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LWU7-C8CX] [hereinafter OMB REPORT] (disclosing that 
federal administrative agencies published 36,457 rules between fiscal years 2005 and 2014). 
 4.  See State of Compliance Survey 2015, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 5 (2015), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/state-of-compliance-survey/assets/pwc-2015-
state-of-compliance-survey-final.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/EFR6-2LRX] (noting the particular 
compliance-related challenges faced by companies that enter the health care or financial 
services market). 
 5.  See Rich Steeves, JPMorgan to Double Compliance Budget in 2014, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/12/12/jpmorgan-to-double-
compliance-budget-in-2014 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/UR9H-835Z] (reporting on JPMorgan’s $2 
billion budget for compliance staffing and training in response to investigations and 
enforcement actions). 
 6.  The True Cost of Compliance, PONEMON INST., LLC 2 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/True_Cost_of_Compliance_Report_copy.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/B3WV-RN4A]. 
 7.  Michael O’Brien, Stress and the Compliance Officer, HUM. RES. EXEC. ONLINE 1 
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id=533344814 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/Q69E-DXRP]. See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of 
Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 
129 n.251 (2014) (noting that a “running theme” of interviews of compliance specialists was 
that the “[Chief Compliance Officer] is a tough and lonely job.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: A Dream 
Career?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2014) (“In a U.S. economy struggling to create jobs, at least 
one field is booming: compliance.”). 
 9.  See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-
Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 571, 591 (2005) (“[L]ittle empirical evidence exists 
regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in deterring organizational 
misconduct . . . .”). 
 10.  See Ken Tysiac, SOX Compliance Costs Rise For Many Companies, Report Finds,
J. ACCOUNTANCY (May 2013), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2013/ 
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rising costs of compliance in the face of ever more complex, far-ranging, 
and sometimes ambiguous regulatory mandates.11
The consequences are significant. If firms perceive their obligations 
as insurmountable, they may turn way from good faith efforts to comply 
and concentrate on spending resources to defy or evade regulation.12  If 
managers become cynical about compliance, a culture of disrespect against 
compliance may develop, which is ultimately harmful to the firm.13  That 
attitude, in turn, foments unethical behavior that is destructive to society at 
large through unethical business practices that destabilize the economy.  A 
climate of doubt and distrust between the regulator and the firm imposes 
losses on both parties and society at large.  With examples of non-
compliance firmly in the public limelight,14 citizens openly question both 
the legitimacy of regulators and corporate actors to maintain the public 
trust.15  Amidst these challenges, the concrete has yet to harden on how to 
optimally produce public-private engagement that meets regulatory goals, 
curtails firm-borne compliance costs, and minimizes negative externalities 
on society. 
Compliance scholars and professionals tend to focus on the 
organization as the relevant locus of action and on procedural and 
may/20137990.html [https://perma.cc/SRQ3-42YH] (noting different ways a focus on 
compliance generates positive results for companies). 
 11.  See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
2013 National Compliance Outreach Program for Broker-Dealers (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515226#P22_4354
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7V7Z-Z9S8] (noting the “overwhelming volume and pace of new and 
anticipated regulations” in the securities industry and the difficulty of firms in complying 
with them). 
 12.  See Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply: That 
Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of Compliance, in
EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 112–13 (Christine Parker 
& Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011) (describing how regulated firms are able to 
“reshape the meaning of compliance” through political contestation).
 13.  Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 12 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 
forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651101 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/72KF-N2XW]. 
 14.  See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys 6–7 (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9W2M-Y6MP] 
(discussing how the Department of Justice’s new policies on individual corporate 
wrongdoing reflect a bolstered regulatory focus on the substantive elements of a company’s 
compliance program). 
 15.  See Christopher M. Matthews, Survey Finds Unethical Business Practices on the 
Rise, WALL. ST. J. (May 23, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/05/23/survey-finds-unethical-business-practices-on-the-rise
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/MG4G-P9NX] (explaining a study evidencing the willingness of many 
corporate executives to partake in unethical business practices). 
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institutional rules as the means of ensuring conformity.16  An overly 
simplistic view of compliance, however, does a disservice to regulators and 
firms alike.  Compliance needs to be understood and addressed 
pragmatically as it exists and with the powerful potential it truly holds.  
Accordingly, this Article develops an efficient investment-risk (EIR) model 
of corporate compliance that illuminates the opportunities in compliance-
based regulation.  Drawing on concepts of law and economics, the EIR 
model shows how firms decide whether—and to what extent—to comply 
along a compliance “frontier” in order to optimize the relative benefits of 
compliance to the firm relative to cost, thereby minimizing avoidable costs 
resulting from inefficient deployment of firm resources.  By highlighting 
the consequences for a firm to comply in any given instance, our model 
increases the effectiveness of business regulation that advances the public 
good.17  The EIR model also equips regulators with a dynamic 
understanding of how compliance functions respond to different kinds of 
regulatory mandates.  Through our model, we identify and define three 
distinct kinds of regulatory mandates—Direct Regulation, Collaborative 
Regulation, and Market Contingent Regulation—and show how regulators 
can strategically use different combinations of regulatory approaches to 
compel more firm-efficient compliance.  Applying the EIR model to 
corporate compliance will increase the overall effectiveness of business 
regulation.  Regulators and lawmakers will be better able to calibrate 
regulatory enforcement measures to public policy goals.  Firms will more 
clearly see the strategic benefits of complying with law through a more 
risk-aware view of their compliance functions. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I examines corporate 
compliance as a set of non-binary, dynamic, and bounded choices by firms 
in response to regulatory mandates.  Instead of static and dichotomous 
decisions of whether to comply or not, compliance requires that firms 
constantly assess the degree to which they want to comply, all the while 
facing factual ambiguity or uncertainty.  Parts II and III develop the EIR 
model in two stages.  In Part II, we demonstrate how compliance can be 
mapped along a continuum of compliance decisions that takes into account 
the costs associated with a firm’s investments in compliance (e.g., 
additional personnel or infrastructure) relative to the risks associated with 
the firm’s decision to comply (i.e., the probability of incurring legal 
 16.  See MILLER, supra note 1, at 171–93 (discussing organizational compliance 
through the internal enforcement of institutional policies and programs). 
 17.  See Paul J. Heald, Economics As One of the Humanities: An Ecumenical Response 
to Weisberg, West, and White, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 293, 309 (1995) (“[W]e should 
remember that the choice between rights and efficiency does not inevitably make the 
efficiency norm look inhumane.”). 
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sanctions for non-compliance multiplied by the penalties or damages from 
enforcement).  Using these concepts, Part III presents the EIR model to 
conceptualize the implications of under-compliance or over-compliance by 
firms.  Finally, Parts IV and V apply the insights of the EIR model to 
address fundamental questions regarding business regulation.  In Part IV, 
we show how different kinds of regulatory mandates influence the dynamic 
relationship between regulators and regulated firms in respect of a firm’s 
decision to comply.  Part V analyzes the ways in which firms can reduce 
compliance risk without investing in additional compliance resources.  This 
is achieved through what we describe as “risk-cost transformation,” and we 
explore how corporations, in particular, can improve individual employee 
decision-making and firm-wide internal governance to achieve this 
potential “win-win” scenario. 
I. COMPLIANCE AS A NON-BINARY, DYNAMIC, AND BOUNDED
CHOICE
Compliance, both as a legal requirement and a business practice, is 
woefully misunderstood.  First, compliance is too often misunderstood as 
conformance with binary rules, whereby a firm is either in compliance or 
out of compliance with the requirement.  Conceiving of compliance as a 
binary rule is not without advantages.  Binary rules offer clear imperatives 
for proper conduct.18  A firm is either in compliance with the rule or out of 
compliance.19  Binary rules offer little in terms of nuance or context.20  As a 
result, binary rules have the advantage of being clear and easy to interpret 
from the regulated firm’s perspective. 
Binary rules, however, can cause problems.  Because such rules are 
inflexible by nature, they may lead to unnecessarily costly or unjust 
outcomes.21  Binary rules also resist contextual interpretation by courts and 
are not easily adaptable to changing social, environmental, or marketplace 
conditions.  They also undermine the opportunity for consideration that 
more flexible rules might produce.  Instead of considering the underlying 
purpose of the regulation, a binary rule encourages a manager to meet a 
 18.  Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 549 (2005). 
 19.  Id.
 20.  Id. See also Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 
637–39 (2005) (describing binary disclosure under the Clean Air Act). 
 21.  See Burk, supra note 18, at 549 (“Rules offer clear imperatives for behavior, but 
this means that they tend to be essentially binary; that is, one is either in compliance or one 
is not.  This in turn means that in their pure form, rules leave little room for nuance or 
factual shading.  Due to their inflexibility, they may lead to costly outcomes if they fit a 
given situation poorly.”). 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 29 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 29 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
2_BIRD_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/17 11:11 AM
2017] TURNING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INTO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 291 
given standard without further reflection.22  This is known as “regulatory 
ritualism,” whereby actors accept means for meeting regulatory goals but 
lose focus on achieving the purpose of those goals.23  Actors use this as a 
means of “get[ting] by” in a regulatory society,24 but risk doing so at an 
eventual cost to the firm. 
Instead of binary conditions, firms can exist in various gradations of 
compliant and non-compliant states.  Firms can be in minor non-
compliance or severe non-compliance depending on the enterprise’s 
deviation from a given regulatory rule or standard.25  Firms can also be 
fully compliant without any deviation.  In addition, compliance with a 
given regulation may be different for each firm according to their unique 
internal and external combination of resources.  A firm’s combination of 
industry, market positioning, human resources, capital investments, and 
relationship with regulators can determine whether and to what extent a 
firm is non-compliant and what conditions are necessary to satisfy the 
regulatory requirement.26
Second, compliance is all too often not treated as a dynamic system.  
Compliance is a system that is typified by constant change, activity, or 
evolution.27  Compliance requirements, even for sweeping regulatory 
 22.  See Malloy, supra note 20, at 662 (applying a binary rule may prevent thoughtful 
consideration of the basis underlying the rule in the first place). 
 23.  Carol A. Heimer & J. Lynn Gazley, Performing Regulation:  Transcending 
Regulatory Ritualism in HIV Clinics, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 853, 856 (2012). 
 24.  Id. (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., REGULATING AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND 
THE NEW PYRAMID 330 (2007)).
 25.  See, e.g., Katie Bergstrom, Brian Dillion & Gray Plant Mooty, Quality of Care as a 
Basis for False Claims Act Liability:  Is the Proof Insurmountable?, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 147, 
148 (2008) (“In fact, in most cases, a [health care] provider’s level of compliance with a 
particular quality of care standard will fall somewhere on a continuum between full 
compliance and no compliance at all.”). 
 26.  See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives:  Myths, Models, and 
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (2002) (conceptualizing how a firm’s 
organization and internal processes affect its reaction to regulation). 
 27.  Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Remarks Before the Investment Adviser Compliance Best Practices 
Summit: Compliance Programs: Our Shared Mission 2 (Feb. 28, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022805lar.htm [https://perma.cc/BY77-TH7S] (“One 
of the most important lessons we have learned is that your compliance program cannot be 
static.  It can’t be ‘done,’ ‘on the shelf,’ or ‘fixed.’  An effective compliance program must 
continue to evolve and, to do so, the program must be able to identify, meet, and incorporate 
changes in your business and changes in your customers, to continue to identify conflicts of 
interest, to be responsive to changes in the statutory and regulatory regime, and to 
continually strive to find the best technology and the best people.  It must be measured by its 
results.  Indeed, much of this conference is dedicated to providing practical advice on how 
to ensure that your compliance program is actively preventing, detecting and correcting 
securities laws violations.  I have heard this concept of an activist compliance program 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 29 S
ide B
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 29 Side B      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
2_BIRD_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/17 11:11 AM
292 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:2 
mandates, are not consistent across different firms.  Each company faces its 
own regulatory mix from which arises the collective compliance 
obligations of the enterprise.  Small companies may be exempt from 
obligations that larger firms must follow.28  Firms in different industries 
may require specialized compliance capacity to respond to industry-
specific regulatory mandates.  One firm may have a more productive 
history with a regulatory authority than another, leaving open the 
possibility of it receiving the benefit of the doubt when non-compliance 
occurs.29  A firm’s culture may require compliance processes to be 
implemented in different ways.  Employees motivated by rewards may be 
more interested and engaged in compliance procedures through 
gamification of compliance standards.30
States of compliance and non-compliance evolve over time.  In 
response to changing regulatory requirements, firms typically use resources 
to improve their compliance practices.31  They train their employees to 
better spot and proactively remedy compliance problems.32  They also hire 
referred to as having a ‘living, breathing’ compliance program.”). 
 28.  See OMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 41–42 (noting that many statutes and 
regulations explicitly attempt to reduce regulatory burdens on small businesses by limiting 
costs and providing exemptions and slower phase-in periods). 
 29.  See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Reforming Pharmaceutical Industry-Physician 
Financial Relationships: Lessons from the United States, France, and Japan, 39 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 662, 665 (2011) (noting passage of guidelines stating that firms that follow an 
industry code are considered to “demonstrate[] good faith efforts” toward compliance). 
 30.  See, e.g., Ryan J. Baxter et al., Applying Basic Gamification Techniques to IT 
Compliance Training:  Evidence from the Lab and Field, 30 J. INFO. SYS. 119, 121 (2016) 
(discussing how gamification can be used as a business tool to engage people in non-game 
situations through a similar type of rewards system); Raymund J. Lin et al., Designing a 
Web-based Behavior Motivation Tool for Healthcare Compliance, 23 HUM. FACTORS &
ERGONOMICS IN MANU. & SVC. INDUS. 58, 61–63 (2013) (designing a program where 
“desired user behaviors can be motivated through proper rewards on actions”).  
 31.  It is theoretically possible, though unlikely, that firms will devolve their 
compliance framework.  One common response to rising compliance costs is outsourcing 
arrangements with third-party service providers. See The Evolving Role of Compliance,
SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N 16–17 (Mar. 2013), 
www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589942363 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2CNG-
EQAP] [hereinafter “SIFMA Compliance White Paper”] (outsourcing may increase 
efficiencies and reduce costs of compliance). 
 32.  See Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance 
Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 979–81 (2012) 
(“Explicit compliance communications are not enough.  Compliance officers must reach 
across functional boundaries to executive management and the human resources group and, 
if necessary, educate them about the principles of employee engagement and the value of 
consistent explicit and behavioral messaging that activates the employees’ values and brings 
out their best natures.  Compliance officers must secure the active cooperation of these 
groups not only in transmitting the right words, but also in modeling ethical behavior, 
trustworthiness, fairness, and quality interpersonal treatment of employees.”). 
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personnel to administer compliance processes and determine necessary 
steps to comply with regulation.  This results in some firms practicing 
compliance better than others, creating the possibility that effective 
compliance can be a source of competitive advantage over rivals.33  Some 
firms will simply do compliance more efficiently and more effectively than 
others.  In addition, investments in capital assets will provide the 
information systems and control processes to monitor firm activity, 
maintain records, and deliver necessary data to regulators and auditors.34
These twin paths of human and capital investment help sustain compliant 
behavior when the firm is under stress and generate compliance norms that 
are self-sustaining.  Firms generally have an overall incentive to comply 
with regulations in the short- and long-term.35
In addition, compliance, somewhat counterintuitively, becomes more 
difficult the more completely a firm seeks to achieve it.  Firms will 
generally seek compliance with the regulations that are least costly to 
follow or have the greatest return on their investment.36  Easily obtained 
gains, however, are eventually consumed as firms need more complicated 
and extensive investments to achieve more complete states of compliance.  
A firm’s first compliance initiative is substantively different in form and 
function than its tenth initiative or its hundredth.  Compliance personnel 
must be agile enough to recognize when processes work and when 
innovations are necessary even when the regulatory waters are quiet.  The 
more firms move toward the ideal of perfection, the more difficult the 
improvements get. 
Third, and perhaps most important, compliance is bounded by human 
limitations.37  Such bounded knowledge arises even before a given rule 
becomes enforceable.  For example, a legislative authority may design a 
rule that is unnecessarily ambiguous or complex.  Such suboptimal drafting 
may be the result of inattention to the consequences of such regulation, lack 
 33.  See generally James Rathz, Compliance as the Competitive Differentiator, 12 DUQ.
BUS. L.J. 13 (2009) (describing potential competitive advantage for compliance in a 
financial services context). 
 34.  See Elizabeth Horrigan Rathz, Organic Compliance . . . Doing More With Less, 12 
DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (“For regulated entities, timely and perceptive identification of 
regulatory and reputational risk contributes to improved productivity and a greater return on 
capital investment over the long run.”). 
 35.  Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in 
Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN L. REV. 713, 716–18 (1997). 
 36.  See Malloy, supra note 26, at 538 (“[R]egulatory investments join in the 
competition and are subject, to varying degrees, to evaluation on the basis of such factors as 
the return on investment, the fit with corporate strategic goals, and the extent of the 
sponsoring sub-unit’s influence within the firm.”). 
 37.  See Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 
AM. BUS. L.J. 643, 658–59 (2012) (focusing on regulator-bounded rationality). 
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of sufficient time and resources by staffers to fully attend to emerging 
language, or deliberate vagueness created in order to ensure amenability by 
antagonistic political interests.38  From the moment the rule is enacted, it is 
already imbedded with imperfections that make complete compliance 
unknowable. 
These human limitations may be amplified by the enforcing regulator.  
Regulators, though in possession of significant expertise, are tasked with 
enforcing a rule that is already unclear.  Regulators are thus often forced to 
interpret and apply uncertain language, increasing the potential further for 
ambiguity and lack of understanding of what precisely the rule demands.39
Regulators or their administrators may also have political assumptions or 
aspirations that color their perception about how “hard” or “softly” a rule 
will be interpreted.40  Such political factors can change when a new 
administration takes control, further obfuscating the ability to define a 
knowable standard for a given rule.  These interpretive limitations, through 
legislative drafter to rulemaking administrator to regulatory enforcer, can 
result in a frustrating metaphorical game of telephone, where the original 
purpose of the drafter travels through multiple actors who either willfully 
or inadvertently muddy the intent of the lawmakers.41
Consequently, when the message of compliance with the rule finally 
reaches the regulated, it faces a separate set of distortive lenses as the rule 
is processed and interpreted by the firm.  Knowledge frictions in 
acquisition or dissemination may prevent employees from optimally 
 38.  See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision 
of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1282 (1983) (“The clash of interest groups, the 
greater ease of sensing the existence of problems than of framing solutions, the wish to 
retain flexibility, the desire to please as wide a constituency as possible, the benefits of 
calculated ambiguity, or the serendipity of unintended ambiguity—all of these have 
produced a growing number of statutes embodying vague standards or none at all.”); 
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schachter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594–95 (2002) (“Staffers regularly cited 
two clarifying-undermining dynamics: the lack of sufficient time and the phenomenon of 
deliberate ambiguity.”). 
 39.  See Horowitz, supra note 38, at 1282–83 (“If [the statute’s] meaning or their reach 
is unclear, someone will have to interpret them.  In the first instance, that someone will 
often be the administrative agency charged with implementing the law.  Sometimes the 
agency has taken a bold view of its authority, which has then been ratified by the courts, and 
sometimes the agency has been found to be too timid in fulfilling its mandate.”). 
 40.  Id.
 41.  See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter:  Rethinking the 
Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 975 (2001) 
(summarizing an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study providing evidence that 
“many violations result from sincere disagreements or differing interpretations of what EPA 
regulations mean”). 
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understanding or complying with rules.42  Aspirations to achieve 
compliance may be insufficient or misdirected.43  Counsel assigned to 
interpret and disseminate the rule can impose their own perspective based 
upon practice background and specialized training.  Individual managers, 
even with guidance, may not have the knowledge capacity to navigate 
complex or unclear rules and thus are left to use shortcut heuristics to 
divine a mandate.  Even if managers are fully guided, agency problems can 
intervene whereby managers bypass responsibility in order to protect or 
further their own careers.44
If, even through all of these interpretive lenses, a standard of 
compliance can be properly understood, exogenous forces can revive 
ambiguity.  Changes in political power can threaten an established 
regulatory agenda.45  Economic shocks can trigger unexpected changes in 
regulation that render prior compliance practices out-of-date.46  Unexcused 
compliance can unexpectedly result from natural disasters.47  Catastrophes 
can trigger legislative overreaction from an angry public, resulting in hasty 
 42.  Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring:  The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 107 (2002) (“This process of social 
construction [of managerial motives] is both personal to each agent and heavily influenced 
by his or her local peers at the firm.  And there is no guarantee that this will produce an 
accurate construction of management’s motives.”).  In the employment context, for 
example, many employees misunderstand their legal rights and obligations under 
employment-at-will laws, erroneously believing they have legal rights akin to just cause.  
See Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will 
in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 310–11, 311 n.16 (2002) (commenting on the 
misperceptions surrounding employment-at-will contracts). 
 43.  See John T. Nicolaou, Whistle While You Work:  How the False Claims Act 
Amendments Protect Internal Whistleblowers, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 531, 540 (2011) 
(noting in the False Claims Act context that an overly broad interpretation of protected 
activity by well-meaning employers can cause employees to run afoul of the rules). 
 44.  See Malloy, supra note 26, at 558–60 (noting the role of specialization within firms 
in respect of profit maximization). 
 45.  See, e.g., House Republicans Take Aim at Dodd-Frank in Budget Plan, REUTERS
(Mar. 17, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/financial-regulation-
housebudget-idUSL2N0WJ0ZC20150317 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/UDJ5-Q6AX](describing 
ongoing efforts in the House of Representatives to weaken and repeal the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 46.  See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk 
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 55, 92–100 (2011) 
(describing the implementation of new disclosure and corporate governance requirements 
under the Dodd-Frank Act to regulate risk management practices). 
 47.  See Natural Events and Disasters, U.S. ENV. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agriculture-natural-events-and-disasters (last visited Feb. 2, 
2016) [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RB7X-8K2Z] (“Even though natural events and disasters can be 
devastating to agricultural production, it does not excuse noncompliance with state and 
federal environmental laws.”). 
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and ill-conceived standards.48  Even without a prior trigger, society can 
simply demand greater compliance than a firm expects, punishing a 
company even when it finds itself fully compliant with established rules.49
To cite a historically prominent example, when a jury found Ford Motor 
Company criminally liable for negligent manufacture of an automobile, it 
did so even though it found that Ford had complied with federal 
government automobile safety standards at the time of manufacture.50  In 
this instance, Ford was in compliance with law, until a jury decided that it 
was not. 
Skilled compliance professionals—whether lawyers or non-legal 
compliance professionals—can bring significant protection, as well as 
value,51 to the enterprise, and a robust compliance program is de rigueur for 
a corporation or any other firm of any substantial size.52  However, any 
attempt to make compliance work must be cognizant of its limitations.  
Corporate compliance is an imperfect science, and those tasked with 
compliance can never achieve a perfect state.53  The forces preventing 
 48.  Cf. Kyle Welch, The Patriot Act and Crisis Legislation: The Unintended 
Consequences of Disaster Lawmaking, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 481 (2015); Gregory L. Ryan, 
Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting:  Why the Inclusion of Perjury as an Aggravated Felony 
Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 989, 991 n.3 (1997) (noting 
overreaction by Congress in response to terrorist acts). 
 49.  See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and 
Environmental Protection:  Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 307, 308 (2004) (defining social license “as the demands on and expectations for a 
business enterprise that emerge from neighborhoods, environmental groups, community 
members, and other elements of the surrounding civil society.”). 
 50.  Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 771 (1981).  See also
Matthew T. Lee, The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of Auto Safety Regulations, 
1893-1978, 27 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 390, 390–91 (1998) (explaining how the NHTSA 
[(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration)] engineer group found the Ford Pinto 
“unsafe” even though its fire threshold met the federal minimum standard); R. Eric 
Reidenbach & Donald P. Robin, A Conceptual Model of Corporate Moral Development, 10 
J. BUS. ETHICS 273, 277 (1991) (describing how Ford’s attorney’s argument was that “the 
Pinto met all federal, state, and local government standards concerning auto fuel systems.”).
The jury in this case nonetheless awarded the plaintiffs $125 million in punitive damages.  
Paul J. Zwier, Due Process and Punitive Damages, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 407, 427–28 (1991). 
 51.  See generally Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate 
Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203 (2016) (describing how corporate 
counsel can improve corporate governance and promote a culture of integrity). 
 52.  Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 488 (2003) (noting the rapid growth in ethics and 
compliance consulting following the Enron scandal and the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). 
 53.  Spence, supra note 41, at 975 (summarizing an EPA study providing persuasive 
evidence that “perfect compliance is almost impossible to achieve even for sophisticated and 
conscientious firms”); Langevoort, supra note 42, at 79 (“Within the securities business and 
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“perfect” compliance are as fundamental as those governing human nature.  
While egregious conduct can certainly be curbed through robust 
enforcement and clear mandates, mistakes, mishaps, and misinterpretations 
are inevitable.54  Social, political, and economic forces can change the 
expectations of compliance without warning.55  No matter how diligent 
compliance professionals are, the practice of compliance is embedded with 
imperfections.  Conflict with the regulatory environment for most firms of 
significant size is all but inevitable. 
II. COMPLIANCE IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF RISK-INTELLIGENCE
If a perfect state of compliance is unachievable, and compliance is 
inundated with constant change, then both regulator and firm must accept 
those conditions in order to make compliance work.  Fortunately, there is 
more to compliance than bounded limitations and dynamically changing 
standards.  Making compliance work requires viewing compliance 
decisions through the lens of risk.  Risk is defined as “the potential for loss 
caused by an event (or series of events) that can adversely affect the 
achievement of a company’s objectives.”56  The understanding of risk has 
matured from reducing the probability of hazards to treating risk in a 
systematic way.57  The management of risk is now a proactive decision that 
firms make in anticipation of key decisions or problems that arise.  The 
decision to comply with rules, even under a compulsive regime, thus 
remains a considered choice.  That choice can trigger sanctions if the 
improper choice is made,58 but is done so with a firm being aware as much 
as it can be of the consequences of that decision. 
elsewhere, there is no reasonable expectation of, or even desire for, perfect compliance with 
law.”). 
 54.  Spence, supra note 41, at 975. 
 55.  See Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J.
CORP. L. 325, 331 (2013) (attributing the rise in enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act to regulatory emphasis on rule of law in foreign markets, greater international 
cooperation with anti-corruption enforcement, and enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 56.  The Risk Intelligent Enterprise, DELOITTE 5 (2013), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Governance-Risk-
Compliance/dttl-grc-riskintelligent-erm-doneright.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7GJM-6Z5D].  On 
constructing this definition, the document states that “[m]any definitions exist, with varying 
degrees of detail and precision. We have analyzed and assimilated several, combined them 
with our own perspective, and distilled the result” to the definition quoted in the text. Id.
 57.  KIT SADGROVE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT 1–2
(2015).
 58.  Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 671 (2006). 
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There are different considerations that impact risk-intelligent decision-
making, but most coalesce under two broad considerations.  The first is the 
risk of non-compliance or compliance risk.59  Firms calculate the 
consequences of their actions if a firm is not in compliance with a rule.  
Non-compliance, as mentioned, is not simply one of two possible choices, 
but one of a range of states that a firm can engage.  Firms can pervasively 
minimize their compliance risk through thorough training of employees, 
implementation of complex control systems, hiring dedicated staff, and 
introducing substantial rewards and penalties that encourage compliant 
decision-making.60  Other firms may not expend resources at all, leaving 
the compliance risk high, or implement measures that produce substantial, 
though not complete, reductions in compliance risk. 
In addition to risk, firms also account for the resources allocated to 
investments in compliance.  While the firm that engages in a pervasive 
compliance program may reduce their risk of non-compliance, they may do 
so at a cost that becomes unsustainable for maintaining a competitive 
market position.  Fundamentally, firms “purchase” a given amount of 
compliance in order to reduce a given amount of risk to the enterprise.61
When measurements of compliance reveal no results, negative results, or 
results that are not proportionate to the cost invested, the purchase decision 
will change.62
 59.  Compliance risk is defined as: 
The adverse consequences that can arise from systemic, unforeseen, or isolated 
violations of applicable laws and regulations, internal standards and policies, 
and expectations of key stakeholders[,] . . . which can result in financial losses, 
reputation damage, regulatory sanctions, and, in severe cases, loss of franchise 
or rejected mergers and acquisitions. 
Michael D. Kelsey & Michael Matossian, Compliance Risk: Ensuring the Risk Taken is the 
Risk Intended, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE 6 (May-June 2004) 
http://www.aba.com/Compliance/Documents/4d653dd0ea5d45bcba1b4ebfa0189003CompR
isk.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/K7SZ-SCQR].  See also Compliance and the Compliance 
Function in Banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION
7 (Apr. 2005) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/QX86-MRAQ] 
(defining compliance risk as “the threat posed to an organization’s financial, organizational, 
or reputational standing resulting from violations of laws or regulations, self-regulatory 
industry standards, codes of conduct, or organizational standards”). 
 60.  For more discussion, see infra Part V.B. 
 61.  William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1359 (1999). 
 62.  Richard S. Gruner, Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and Overcoming Legal 
Uncertainty in Business Enterprises and Other Complex Organizations, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 247, 311 (2014). 
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The combination of investments in compliance protocols and the risk 
of non-compliance can be visualized in the following figure: 
FIGURE 1. INTERSECTIONS OF COMPLIANCE RISK AND COST
The horizontal x-axis is the risk adjusted “price” or “cost” of non-
compliance, which represents the total risk to which the firm is currently 
exposed.  This axis is intended to incorporate whatever costs facing the 
enterprise that may arise from non-compliance, including formal penalties, 
reputational impacts on customers, organizational morale costs, relations 
with regulators, and perceptions of society.  These costs are risk-adjusted in 
order to account for their likelihood of actually arising.  The lower the 
firm’s risk-adjusted cost of compliance, the farther to the left the firm 
appears on the x-axis.  The vertical y-axis is the quantity of resources a 
firm invests in human and capital compliance.  Like the x-axis, this can 
include virtually any protocol that the firm deems necessary to achieve a 
sufficient compliance program.  This can include training employees, 
hiring compliance professionals, monitoring requirements, and investing in 
information technology.  The higher the firm’s position on the y-axis, the 
more investments in compliance the firm has made. 
Finally, the combination of the firm’s compliance investments and the 
risk in its environment produce a compliance position for the enterprise.  
This compliance position highlights a given commitment to investing in 
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compliance resources and the resultant non-compliance risks that exist as a 
result of that investment.  Crucially, this depiction of the compliance 
function is scalable along multiple dimensions: it can be applied to analyze 
the decision-making of a single employee tasked with conforming to a 
single regulation, or an entire firm evaluating its compliance practices in 
light of the sum of regulatory mandates to which it is subject. 
Figure 1 offers three examples.  Assume that at point “a,” a firm 
invests $1 in compliance protocols, as reflected on the y-axis.  As a result 
of these investments, the firm sustains a risk exposure of $5.  The total cost 
of compliance, as expressed by intersection of the axes, is $6.  At point “b,”
a firm increases its investments to $2.  As one would expect when a firm 
allocates more resources to compliance, the firm’s risk-adjusted cost of 
non-compliance changes in response.  In the example provided, at point 
“b”, the firm’s $2 investment in compliance results in its risk exposure 
decreasing to $3.  Total cost of compliance at point “b” is $5.  Point “c” is 
the inverse of “b,” as the firm invests $3 and has $2 of risk exposure.  At 
point “d,” the firm has substantially increased its investments to $5, 
perhaps representing an aggressive initiative to avoid legal and societal 
exposure from violated rules.  This $5 investment at point “d” generates a 
risk exposure of only $1 for the enterprise, with a total cost of $6.  Each 
point has its own combination of investment input and output of a given 
risk level. 
Figure 1 reveals meaningful information regarding the nature of 
compliance.  First, compliance is judged through both price and risk 
criteria, which makes the necessary investments accountable to reductions 
in risk exposure.  Second, firms have the power to make choices about 
those criteria independently or in conjunction with one another.  Third, 
regardless of how firms perceive the price of compliance and the risk of 
non-compliance, a compliance decision forces these two factors to interact 
with one another.  Fourth, the interaction of price and risk places the firm 
in a single position within the range of possible compliance positioning 
choices.  A firm’s compliance profile does not arise by chance but through 
tacit or deliberate choices to weigh investments relative to risk. 
Notably, not all of the choices in Figure 1 are created equal.  Points 
“d” and “a” are essentially the same from the firm’s perspective.  The 
primary difference between the choices is to whom the cost of compliance 
is paid.  At point “a,” most of the cost of compliance is paid in sanctions 
and penalties.  At point “d,” most of the cost of compliance arises from 
investments in protocols by the firm.  Points “b” and “c”, however, 
represent a superior choice for the firm.  The net cost of compliance is only 
$5, lower than what it costs at “a” or “d.”  This allows the firm, through 
optimal allocation of resources, to receive a greater reduction in risk 
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relative to its investments in compliance.  It represents a risk-efficient 
position, and one that firms should naturally seek out. 
This difference in value more accurately represents how compliance 
actually functions.  Firms are rarely indifferent about compliance.  
Managers do not typically conclude that the same price will be paid no 
matter what action the firm takes, whether it be payment in sanctions or 
investments.  The choice to either invest in compliance or pay the cost of 
non-compliance implies imperfect substitutes.  Firms can switch between 
compliance and sanction, but the tradeoff is not identical.  This means that 
a firm can select a suboptimal compliance strategy and pay $6, or seek out 
the superior positioning and pay $5. 
Given the presence of imperfect substitutes and the nearly infinite 
range of choices from which a firm can choose a compliance position, the 
compliance options of a firm can be modeled as shown in the following 
figure:
FIGURE 2. A CONTINUUM OF FIRM COMPLIANCE
The compliance function in Figure 2 is a “flipped” version of the 
production function.63  Value is represented on the x-axis and cost is 
represented on the y-axis.  The productivity frontier is represented by a 
downward concave continuum of best practices that a firm can attain for a 
given combination of cost-value activities.  In this production function, a 
firm can choose a high-cost, high-value production strategy or a low-cost, 
 63.  In microeconomics, a production function involves a tradeoff between two or more 
inputs that produce a given output.  WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 311 (6th 
ed. 1995). 
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low-value alternative.64  Most firms would be somewhere “beneath” the 
curve, choosing a given cost-value function while striving to make their 
production processes more efficient, and thus toward the productivity 
frontier.
In the compliance context, rather than trying to deliver the maximum 
value-cost combination, firms seek to minimize their risk-cost profile 
through compliance practices.  In Figure 2, the range of input choices is 
modeled by a curved line that highlights the set of points at which the 
combination of investment and risk choices produces a series of outputs 
(e.g., here, the total firm cost of compliance).  The concavity of the curved 
line shows the substitutability of compliance “goods” on the x and y axis 
— i.e., the substitutability of compliance investments versus exposure to 
non-compliance.  The curved line represents a continuum of choices that 
incorporate different investment-risk profiles—in other words, a 
compliance frontier.65  A firm set at a point on the lower right end of the 
compliance frontier chooses to invest few resources in compliance.  Those 
resources in labor and capital can be invested somewhere else to make the 
firm more competitive, but leave the firm exposed to a high risk of non-
compliance and the associated penalty and reputational costs that arise if a 
violation is recognized.  A firm at the upper left end of the compliance 
frontier presents an aggressively low compliance risk profile.  There is little 
chance that such a firm will be found non-compliant, insulating itself from 
the indirect and direct costs that arise from breaking the rules.  However, 
such a firm achieves that low risk state at a great, indeed inefficiently great, 
cost of resources.  The firm spends more on compliance than it generates in 
risk reduction return.  Those resources lost cannot be allocated elsewhere to 
 64.  A helpful, albeit highly simplified, description of the productivity function is 
presented in Michael E. Porter, What is Strategy?, 74 HARV. BUS. REV. 61, 62 (1996).  
Porter explains: 
Think of it as the maximum value that a company delivering a particular 
product or service can create at a given cost, using the best available 
technologies, skills, management techniques, and purchased inputs.  The 
productivity frontier can apply to individual activities, to groups of linked 
activities such as order processing and manufacturing, and to an entire 
company’s activities.  When a company improves its operational effectiveness, 
it moves toward the frontier. Doing so may require capital investment, different 
personnel, or simply new ways of managing. 
Id.
 65.  The notion of compliance as a continuum has been indirectly applied in a variety of 
contexts to conceptualize compliant conduct by an individual or a firm. See, e.g., Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1035–
36 (2009) (describing a tax compliance continuum); Bergstrom et al., supra note 25, at 148 
(discussing health care provider compliance as a continuum). 
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advance the enterprise.66
Viewed in dynamic terms, the concavity of the compliance frontier 
determines the nature of the tradeoff between investment and risk, with the 
firm investing more or less in compliance initiatives, as illustrated by the 
following figure: 
FIGURE 3. VARIATIONS IN THE CONCAVITY OF 
COMPLIANCE FRONTIERS
In Figure 3, the straight line (a) would represent a compliance frontier 
in which investments in compliance and non-compliance penalties are 
perfect substitutes.  A perfect substitute would mean that investments and 
non-compliance penalties have the same effect from the firm’s perspective.  
Both represent expenditures that the firm must pay; whether to regulators 
and the public or through private investments, the cost remains the same.  If 
investments and non-compliance penalties were perfect substitutes, firms 
would be indifferent to compliance practices because the outcome would 
be the same—an expenditure by the firm. 
Compliance investments and non-compliance penalties are not perfect 
substitutes, however, and replacement of one for the other changes the 
overall equation.  That imperfection in substitution is represented in the 
model by the curved line.  Different locations on the curve represent 
different places where investments are cheaper than penalties or vice versa.  
 66.  Firms in the center of the curve neither over nor underinvest in compliance form a 
subject that will be discussed in more detail with a more complex model later in this Article.  
See infra Part IV. 
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The compliance frontier represented by curve (b), a weakly concave curve, 
would represent some imperfect substitution.  The compliance frontier 
represented by curve (c) represents even less imperfect substitutes.  The 
greater the concavity of the curve, the less substitutable the investment and 
penalty choices are on a compliance profile.  The compliance frontier 
represented by line (d) represents an unusual situation where the 
incremental investments in compliance are so low per unit of risk reduction 
that reducing risk as much as possible is always the best option.  Every unit 
of investment in compliance generates more than that unit of return in 
reduced risk. Conversely, the compliance frontier represented by line (e)
represents another unusual situation where compliance investments are so 
incrementally costly that the firm’s best incentive is to not invest at all and 
simply pay whatever penalties arise.  Any unit of investment will not result 
in an equal or greater reduction in risk, and such investments are therefore 
inefficient.
III. THE EFFICIENT INVESTMENT-RISK MODEL OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE
As described above, a firm’s decision to comply incorporates an 
inverse production function expressed as a compliance frontier.  However, 
compliance in practice is inefficient due to the inability of firms to assess 
and weigh the tradeoffs between investment in compliance and risk of non-
compliance.  To address this problem, the following discussion builds on 
this compliance function to develop the efficient investment-risk (EIR) 
model.  The EIR model applies the economic concepts of technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency to compliance in order to identify the 
inputs used by firms to most efficiently expend and allocate limited 
resources towards compliance. 
A. Impediments to Efficient Compliance 
Firms explicitly or tacitly assume a compliance profile that represents 
a mix of compliance investment and risk exposure.  Another variable that 
must be considered is the problem of information frictions, which can 
impede the acquisition and utilization of full knowledge required in order 
for a firm to make an optimal decision.  Frictions occur when employees 
lack sufficient knowledge about the compliance profile of the firm.  
Employees may not have received correct or complete information about 
the compliance goals, corporate culture, or organizational risks of the 
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enterprise.67  These agents, typically employees, will be out of sync with 
what the firm wants to achieve in compliance.68  Thus, employees may act 
in suboptimal fashion, either by overweighting compliance at the expense 
of potential opportunities or underweighting compliance and exposing the 
company to unnecessary compliance risk. 
Even if the optimal state of compliance is fully known to an 
enterprise, and that information is at least theoretically available, employee 
decision-making may prevent the firm from realizing optimal compliance.  
Employees may embody the classic principal-agent problem, in that their 
actions serve their own self-interest at the expense of the firm.  For 
example, a temporary salesperson responsible for selling his or her 
company’s products to foreign governments may be more willing to violate 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)69 because the value of a short-
term commission exceeds the risk of individual liability.  A violation of the 
FCPA may come at a high price of non-compliance to the firm as 
principal,70 which the employee as agent does not fully internalize.71  In 
addition, the predisposition of the human mind toward mental shortcuts and 
assumptions often impairs individual decision-making.72  Such rationality 
intends to be rational, but only limitedly,73 and can result in decisions that 
 67.  This happens as law becomes endogenous within organizations, and the meaning 
and interpretation of law becomes increasingly institutionalized within organizational 
structures.  Edelman & Talesh, supra note 12, at 109–10.  Edelman and Talesh posit that 
these organizational structures can be exposed to the judiciary, which in time may shape 
constructions of law. Id. at 110. 
 68.  Id. at 109–10. 
 69.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2012)). 
 70.  See David Hess, Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparency: Using 
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 42, 42–43 (2012) 
(noting the sharp increase in FCPA enforcement activity since 2007 and characterizing 
FCPA enforcement risk as “a top issue for corporate legal and compliance departments”). 
 71.  See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 20–22 (2012) (citing evidence of the lack of individual prosecutions 
relative to corporate FCPA enforcement actions); Yockey, supra note 55, at 354–55 (noting 
the principal-agent problem in anti-corruption enforcement and observing that FCPA 
sanctions are primarily borne by organizations). 
 72.  Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 
PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956) (“Since the organism . . . has neither the senses nor the wits 
to discover an ‘optimal’ path . . . [it will apply] a choice mechanism that will lead it to 
pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at some specified level of all 
of its needs.”). See generally Jon Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 
670–72 (1996) (discussing the limits cognitive heuristics can impose on reasoning and 
decision-making).
 73.  Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1090 n.4 (1981) (describing bounded rationality as “intendedly rational, but only 
limit[ly] so” (citations intentionally omitted)).   
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generate unnecessary exposure to penalties or authorize expenditures that 
cause overinvestment.  The cognitive limits of individual employees have a 
collective impact on the organization, which the firm’s decision-makers 
may not be able to recognize.74  The frictions and bounds of information 
create an environment where a firm may not be able to reach its own 
optimal preferences.  Therefore, firms must develop systems and processes 
to ensure their compliance function is both efficient and effective. 
Firms building risk-compliant systems and processes are pursuing 
what is defined as technical efficiency.  Technical efficiency is the ability 
of a firm to produce a level of output with a minimum quantity of input.75
Such inputs include capital, labor, and equipment, which are used in a 
fashion that does not waste resources.76  Firms identify relevant risks, 
assess and evaluate those risks, and then respond to them in a fashion that 
can be readily implemented and monitored over time.77  Investments can be 
made in areas such as human resources, information technology, auditing, 
legal, and compliance.  This results in a reduced exposure to risk from non-
compliance that can impair a firm’s reputation, trigger costly fines, impede 
operations, or impact a firm’s long-term strategy.78
Technical efficiency, however, does not mean achieving compliance 
at all costs.79  Firms can expose themselves to substantial risk of non-
compliance and remain technically efficient if the returns on those risks are 
sufficiently high.80  This cost-benefit approach requires executives to be 
 74.  See Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of 
Disclosure, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 1059, 1080–84 (2011) (describing how individuals find it 
difficult to undo biases in their own judgment when faced with new information). 
 75.  R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and Economic 
Efficiency: A Study of A Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679, 690 (2000). See
also John A. Nyman & Simonetti Samuels, The Boren Amendment and Data Envelopment 
Analysis, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 335, 339 (1997) (defining “technical efficiency” as 
“produc[ing] a level of output (or outputs) using a technology that does not waste 
resources”).
 76.  Nyman & Samuels, supra note 75, at 339–40 (discussing the interplay of labor, 
capital, and technology to determine technical efficiency).   
 77.  The Risk Intelligent Chief Compliance Officer, DELOITTE 13,
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Governance-Risk-
Compliance/dttl-grc-riskintelligentchiefcomplianceofficer.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/8MAW-3ZZZ] (discussing the ERM and compliance risk management 
processes).
 78.  Id. at 15 (describing how compliance problems can negatively impact certain areas, 
including reputation, operations, strategy, and finance).
 79.  Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 346 
(1996) (noting that compliance without regard to costs is not desirable, as it can lead to too 
much spending on compliance precautions). 
 80.  DELOITTE, supra note 77, at 9 (noting that a company can incur inherent risk when 
the potential returns outweigh the risk—this is a decision left to company leaders and their 
perspectives on risk).
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able to accept residual risk and restrict that risk to a specific tolerance.81  At 
the same time, firm leaders will have zero-tolerance for compliance failures 
that fall outside of that accepted risk.82  As one useful analogy puts it, 
“many people who run for fitness willingly tolerate a slightly higher risk of 
joint injury (relative to non-runners) as a fair trade for running’s overall 
benefits.  That doesn’t mean they ignore it if their knees start to hurt.”83
The technically efficient firm is the active runner, reaching the potential 
(though bounded) frontier of compliance practice by attaining the 
maximum reduction of compliance risk with a minimum of cost, given the 
firm’s culture and tolerance for acceptable risk. 
The acquisition and attainment of technically efficient compliance can 
be a seductive goal for the firm.84  Technical efficiency is easier to identify 
through the relative rarity of non-compliant events.  It is also easier to 
display tangibly through technology and investments in human resources.  
These investments, in turn, are visible and cognizable signals to the market 
that a firm is doing its best to meet the state of the art of compliance 
practices.  Compliance investments are thus commonly reported as budget 
increases, allocation of additional manpower, and capital investments—the 
hallmarks of technical efficiency.85
Technical efficiency, however, is only one aspect that influences firm 
behavior toward compliance.  It does not necessarily satisfy a firm’s goal of 
full economic efficiency.  A firm may have utilized maximum resources 
with minimum cost to achieve a particular compliant state, but it may also 
have mismatched its resource allocations to achieve its overall optimal risk 
profile.  The result can place the firm in one of two possible states of 
compliance.  Firms can be over-compliant relative to the benefit they 
receive for certain compliance allocations.  Such firms may have achieved 
a state of low compliance risk, but they have done so with an over-
expenditure of resources that brings relatively little reduction of risk 
relative to cost.  Firms can also be under-compliant.  Such firms do not 
 81.  Not only is perfect compliance unachievable, it is also inefficient.  See Langevoort, 
supra note 42, at 79 (“Within the securities business and elsewhere, there is no reasonable 
expectation of, or even desire for, perfect compliance with law. . . . The optimal level of 
compliance is one that balances the costs and benefits.”). 
 82.  DELOITTE, supra note 77, at 9 (discussing that a company can have incur some risk 
while also having a zero-tolerance policy for known compliance failures). 
 83.  Id. at 9. 
 84.  See KAREN PARSLEY & PHILOMENA CORRIGAN, QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN 
HEALTHCARE: PUTTING EVIDENCE INTO PRACTICE 5–6 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that focusing on 
technical efficiency is “seductive” because it is easier to identify). 
 85.  See Stacey English & Susannah Hammond, Cost of Compliance 2014, REUTERS 4
(2014), https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/GRC00814.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/E43F-GTJD] (discussing the rising expenses and time investment of 
compliance and compliance teams worldwide).  
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make compliance investments that would provide an equal or greater 
benefit to the firm in risk reduction relative to the compliance cost.  Under-
compliant firms leave themselves exposed to unnecessary risk that could be 
rectified with measures less costly than the risk of exposure. 
Both over-compliance and under-compliance can occur even if a firm 
remains technically efficient.  A firm may, for example, achieve state-of-
the-art compliance but do so in a way that costs too much relative to the 
risk reduced.  This requires that firms take into account the concept of 
allocative efficiency, which represents a firm’s ability to use its inputs in 
their most effective proportions in order to maximize the firm’s welfare.86
An allocatively efficient state of compliance is one that applies resources at 
the state-of-the-art compliance but also does so in a fashion that optimally 
balances cost and risk.87  While a technically efficient firm extracts 
maximum output from a given use of resources,88 an allocatively efficient 
firm represents the best possible use of a range of possible uses of 
resources.  For example, assume that a firm uses its compliance officers 
only to process paperwork.  If those compliance officers attain the 
maximum paperwork processing possible given resources utilized, this 
would be a technically efficient process.  However, compliance officers 
who are deployed to create innovative compliance systems and promote a 
compliance culture, for example, would be more allocatively efficient than 
their paper pushing equivalents.89
A firm must both be technically and allocatively efficient in order to 
achieve the optimal state of firm compliance.90  Put simply, while technical 
 86.  Noel D. Uri, Technical Efficiency, Allocative Efficiency, and the Implementation of 
a Price Cap Plan in Telecommunications in the United States, 4 J. APP. ECON. 163, 172 
(2001). See also DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS
13 (2d ed. 2011) (defining allocative efficiency as the distribution of goods and services in 
an economy to maximize social welfare). 
 87.  See Grafton et al., supra note 75, at 690 (“A production process is allocatively 
efficient in its input usage when the firm equates ratios of marginal products with the input 
price ratios to minimize cost given output and input prices.  Allocative efficiency (AE) 
represents the reduction in production costs if production were both technically and 
allocatively efficient, rather than technically efficient but allocatively inefficient.”). 
 88.  Uri, supra note 86, at 172 n.7 (“TE measures only that portion of inefficiency that 
could be eliminated by proportional reduction of inputs. It is the proximity of the data point 
(y1, x1) to the facet of the piecewise linear envelopment surface. Even after reducing input 
use by (1 - TE), however, some inputs may still exhibit slack (i.e., be used inefficiently).”). 
 89.  See X-Inefficiency, WIKIPEDIA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X-inefficiency (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016) [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/U897-3TL5] (providing a useful example of a firm 
using its brain surgeons to dig ditches to highlight the difference between technical and 
allocative efficiency). See also Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency,
56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966) (comparing allocative efficiency to other types of economic 
efficiency).
 90.  Grafton et al., supra note 75, at 683. 
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efficiency achieves “doing right compliance,” allocative efficiency 
describes a firm that is “doing compliance right.”  Doing compliance right 
is not easy.  A variety of influential forces pulls firms away from allocative 
efficiency and towards over- or under-compliance.  One of the simplest 
problems is that firms may misunderstand a rule as being more rigorous 
than it is in reality and mismanage resources to meet perceived standards.  
This may be due to a lack of information arising from inadequate 
compliance or legal personnel or due to overcautious interpretations of 
ambiguous standards.91
A firm’s risk culture can also encourage misallocation.  An under-
compliant risk culture may underestimate the likelihood of non-compliance 
and overestimate its ability to navigate out of trouble when non-compliance 
is brought to the attention of regulators.  One of the most prominent 
examples of an under-compliant risk culture is Citigroup’s prior to the 
financial crisis of 2008.92  Citigroup’s risk models, and its overall cultural 
attitude towards risk, did not account for the possibility that the national 
housing boom on which it relied could experience a downturn.93  Such a 
culture of risk attraction can create disincentives for compliance, and 
unnecessarily expose the firm to harm.94
Less intuitive—but arguably no less relevant—is the possibility that a 
firm’s culture can also encourage over-compliance.  For corporations, the 
locus of decision-making authority with respect to compliance resides with 
the board of directors.95  The board of directors is subject to a duty to 
 91.  See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (presenting under-compliance and over-
compliance as two alternative paths when faced with uncertainty in legal standards and 
noting the tendency toward over-compliance as more common); John E. Calfee & Richard 
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV.
965, 966 (1984) (discussing how uncertainty may lead to over-compliance). But see Tom 
Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 445, 446 (2004) (stating that the reaction to uncertainty in 
regulation may also be a function of the risk aversion of the individual); Chin-Chin Yap, 
The Tax Shelter Game, 59 TAX LAW. 1021, 1036 (2006) (stating in the taxation context that 
“increased uncertainty induces greater compliance in risk averse individuals but induces 
lower compliance of risk seeking individuals”). 
 92.  See Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1323, 1345–58 (2010) (discussing the effects of Citigroup’s cultural norms); see
also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory 
Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 71 (2014) (showing how Citigroup had a high-risk culture). 
 93.  Willmarth, supra note 92, at 104. 
 94.  See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 114–22 (2003) (describing the impact of 
corporate culture on the ineffectiveness of risk management). 
 95.  Regulation incentivizes firms to institutionalize the board’s compliance oversight.  
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a compliance program is deemed effective 
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monitor compliance, established by the Delaware Chancery Court’s 
decision In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,96 but may 
not be able to easily do so due to their distance from day-to-day 
management of the firm.  The Caremark standard does not impose hair 
trigger liability, as directors must either “utterly fail” to implement or 
“consciously fail” to monitor an existing compliance program to be held at 
fault.97  Nonetheless, board members, corporate managers, and executives 
alike may be overly conservative because of their personal liability 
exposure.98  A firm’s regulatory culture may be an important driver of over-
compliance. Firms may have a tendency towards over-compliance due to a 
disproportionate fear of sanction.99  Another benign interpretation is that 
lawyers, because of their professional training and conduct standards, place 
a paramount emphasis on process over result.100  The risk-averse tendencies 
of lawyers may be heightened by accountability standards to which 
corporate gatekeepers—such as corporate counsel as well as auditors and 
compliance officers—are subject.101  This, in turn, creates a pressure within 
the firm to attempt “absolute assurance” of compliant behavior, which is all 
but impossible to achieve.102  Yet, efforts to achieve that absolute assurance 
can certainly be made, creating a compliance culture that over-expends 
and thus eligible for credit or reduced sanctions if “[t]he organization’s governing authority 
[is] knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program 
and [ ] exercise[s] reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness 
of the compliance and ethics program.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2015). 
 96.  698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 97.  MILLER, supra note 1, at 63; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk 
Management, 34 J. CORP. LAW 967, 976–77 (2009). See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 
2006) (confirming and clarifying the Caremark standard under Delaware law). But see
Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability 
in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 111–12 (2006) (arguing that the business 
judgment rule effectively precludes judicial scrutiny into the adequacy of a corporation’s 
compliance program). 
 98.  But see ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 148–50 
(2014) (noting that in practice, personal liability of corporate executives is sharply curtailed 
by the prevalence of D&O indemnification and insurance agreements). 
 99.  See Michael W. Peregrine, Caution by Company Officers Can Create Problems for 
Boards, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/ 
business/dealbook/caution-by-company-officers-can-create-problems-for-boards.html
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3PLG-K3TN] (arguing the self-protective conduct arising from fear of 
personal legal liability may hinder certain company initiatives). 
 100.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight 
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 308–09 (2004) (demonstrating that the 
business judgment rule leads lawyers to focus on process designs and controls).  
 101.  Peregrine, supra note 99 (describing how corporate gatekeepers engage in self-
protective conduct at the potential expense of strategic firm initiatives). 
 102.  Cunningham, supra note 100, at 308–09. 
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resources relative to actual risk. 
A less benign possibility is that over-compliance is being stoked by 
professional service providers—such as compliance officers, auditors, 
attorneys, and management consultants—that are incentivized to dramatize 
or even exaggerate compliance risk in order to generate revenue or accrue 
prestige and influence.103  This may be especially effective when legal 
regimes are new and their implications uncertain.104  For example, when 
wrongful discharge protections for employees were increasing in 
prominence during the 1980s, human resources consultants applied 
hyperbolic language to describe these legal innovations.  The trade 
literature was subjected to a steady stream of publications citing the 
“epidemic,” “avalanche,” and “explosion” of employment litigation.105
Managers during that time period learned of exceptional cases with very 
large jury awards, warnings about jury bias against employers, and the 
looming threat of massive punitive damages.106  This hyperbole may have 
increased the professional influence of consultants and perhaps the amount 
of business they could generate.107
More recent reforms may have attracted a similar increase in 
consultative influence.  The financial regulatory reforms enacted over the 
past fifteen years have been a substantial driver of external compliance 
costs.  To cite one prominent example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
implemented new corporate reporting mandates.108  Audit and law firms, in 
particular, sought to exploit the costs associated with SOX non-compliance 
to corporate boards.109  More recently, advocates for the emerging 
corporate compliance field have emphasized liability risk from sanctions 
 103.  Krawiec, supra note 52, at 528–32 (describing the self-interested role of legal 
compliance professionals, which include lawyers, ethics and compliance consultants, and 
internal compliance personnel). See also Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law 
Consultants”, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006) (discussing the emergence of the law 
consulting industry in areas such as compliance)  
 104.  See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 529–30 (noting how legal compliance professionals 
economically benefit from incomplete or vague legal rules). 
 105.  Lauren B. Edelman, Steven B. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Professional
Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 
64–68 (1992). 
 106.  Id. at 68. 
 107.  Id. at 76–77. 
 108.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified in sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 
29 U.S.C. (2012)).  These mandates require, most notably, that companies certify and attest 
to their financial statements and disclose information regarding their internal controls and 
financial reporting procedures.  15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2012). 
 109.  Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revising 
Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 966–68, 
971–72 (2006). 
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under the Dodd-Frank Act110 and other new regulatory regimes as 
justification for bolstering in-house compliance functions.111
B. Risk-Intelligence Compliance Through an Efficient Investment-Risk 
Model 
Regardless of the source, firms are subjected to significant internal 
and external pressures to over-comply or under-comply with regulations.  
How firms determine their allocative efficiency and technical efficiency 
depends upon a given firm’s regulatory and resource mix.  This view may 
be conceptualized in a dynamic, multi-variable model of corporate 
compliance that accounts for a firm’s risk aversion, technical efficiency 
investments, allocative efficiency positioning, and its specific internal and 
external regulatory environments.  This efficient investment-risk (EIR) 
model is shown in the following figure: 
FIGURE 4. THE EFFICIENT INVESTMENT-RISK MODEL
The curved line represents the compliance frontier—i.e., the sum of all 
existing best practices for compliance with a particular regulation by a 
 110.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 111.  See John G. Browning, Why Chief Compliance Officers are More Important than 
Ever, D MAG. 2–4 (July-Aug. 2013), http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-
ceo/2013/july-august/why-chief-compliance-officers-are-more-important-than-ever
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/53N5-TZUK] (describing the role of compliance professional 
membership organizations, such as Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics and the 
Health Care Compliance Association). 
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particular firm.  The compliance frontier assumes that investments in 
compliance and penalties from compliance are moderately imperfect 
substitutes.  While investments can reduce penalties, for example, the ratio 
of investments made to penalties reduced changes according to the quantity 
of investments made, similar to the decision firms actually face in a 
competitive and regulated market.  The firm can choose a high-risk, low-
cost compliance strategy that keeps compliance cheap but exposes the 
company to potential liability. Conversely, the firm can invest heavily in 
compliance and minimize most risks, but at great expense.  The concave 
curve represents the continuum of optimal compliance practices given a 
particular risk-cost combination by the enterprise.  Most firms would be 
somewhere “above” the compliance frontier, striving both to minimize 
their risk of compliance and reduce the cost of doing so. 
TE represents the risk-combinations at the compliance frontier.  A 
firm reaching a point on TE has achieved technical efficiency for its risk-
cost profile.  That firm is using its resources most effectively given its risk 
culture and environment.  It is important to note that such combinations 
along the TE frontier are curvilinear, and not simply linear, in nature.  If the 
TE curve represented a linear relationship (specifically, that of a diagonal 
line running from TEb to TEa), the choice of risk-cost combinations firms 
would be irrelevant. Any choice along the line would be as efficient as the 
next.
However, the risk-cost relationship that arises from compliance tends 
to be curvilinear in nature.  A firm at TEb has made few, if any, investments 
in regulatory compliance and is at a high risk of non-compliance.112  For 
such “low-hanging fruit,” firms can substantially reduce their risk exposure 
with only a minimum of resources.113  This may be as simple as informing 
employees of the need for compliance and to be aware of issues that may 
arise.  Reward programs for compliant behavior can incentivize employees 
and also convey positive cultural message with little effort.114  Investments 
 112.  It is possible that a firm making no investments in compliance may still achieve a 
compliance state due to the moral compulsion of certain firm’s employees to comply even 
without support from their employer, investments in place for unrelated reasons that happen 
to promote compliance, or sheer luck. 
 113.  See Edwin G. Foulke Jr., Managing an OSHA Inspection: Former OSHA Chief 
Advises Employers to Address ‘Low-Hanging Fruit,’ OSHA GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES NEWSL., Feb. 2013, at 4 (advising the correction of “low-hanging fruit” as an 
easy way to avoid citations and fines). 
 114.  See Killingsworth, supra note 32, at 986 (“Examples of low-hanging fruit . . . 
include consideration of ethical leadership and compliance in performance reviews, 
compensation and promotion decisions, especially for managers; recognition of employees 
who have conspicuously done ‘the right thing’ in difficult situations; and time off or a pizza 
party for the work group that finishes compliance training first.”). 
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like these are easy to implement and generate significant “bang” for the 
compliance “buck.”115  As firms make these investments, they move on the 
TE curve from TEb toward TEi.116  Each investment in compliance generates 
a proportionally greater return in the form of reduced compliance risk. 
Over time, as the metaphorical low-hanging fruit of compliance is 
plucked, returns on compliance investments decline.  Once the firm passes 
TEi, the cost of compliance increases at a marginal rate greater than the 
return it provides in reduced risk of non-compliance.  Compliance 
investments at this state are not worth their return on investment to the 
firm. As a firm approaches TEa, compliance investments are highly costly 
and generate little if any additional risk-reduction return.  For example, if 
employees were required to attend daily one-hour compliance meetings and 
change their passwords on an hourly basis, it might improve regulatory 
compliance, nudging the firm towards TEa, but do so at an unacceptably 
high productivity cost to the enterprise.  Where firms fall on the curve is 
determined by the firm’s risk-cost profile. 
The AE line represents a firm’s pursuit of allocative efficiency.  
Moving from the most inefficient state at AEa, a firm pursues allocative 
efficiency along the diagonal line until it reaches AEi.  Firms positioned at 
AEb, or elsewhere on the AE line, represent firms that are using compliance 
inputs in their optimal proportion without achieving the technical efficiency 
necessary to drive their risk-cost profile toward AEi.  While technical 
efficiency is a necessary precondition to achieve allocative efficiency,117
such firms on the AE line are already “doing compliance right,” but simply 
need to improve their efficiency in investments to achieve both technical 
and allocative efficiency.  These firms could be thought of as allocatively 
sub-efficient, insofar that they have achieved optimal proportional use of 
resources but need to generate efficient input use. 
The point AEi, TEi represents the point at which a firm achieves both 
technical and allocative efficiency.  At this point, the firm has achieved the 
greatest reduction in non-compliance risk relative to the cost of compliance 
 115.  See Jeffrey J. Sama, Environmental Permits in the Next Century: The DEC’s 
Deputy Permit Administrator Outlines His Recipe for Reform, 1 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK
15, 21 (1995) (noting in the environmental context that “selective and targeted compliance 
activities provide a lot more ‘bang for the buck,’ and preserve the benefits of regulatory 
reform while enabling compliance staff to devote the bulk of their time to high risk and 
environmentally sensitive regulated activities”). 
 116.  This assumes that the firm has reached TE.  Firms that have not achieved technical 
efficiency will be limited by their own bounded curve with the same curvilinear shape as TE
but one closer to AEb or even AEa.
 117.  See Daniel Clough, Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints in Australia, 25 
MELB. U. L. REV. 551, 555 (2001) (defining the relationship between technical and 
allocative efficiency). 
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invested.  Any increases in compliance investment from this point would 
bring decreasing risk-reduction returns.  Also, any reductions in 
compliance investment would bring disproportionally increasing exposure 
to non-compliance.  AEi, TEi represents the optimal point for a firm’s 
compliance function.  In a perfectly efficient compliance system, firms 
would seek to reach this point.  Accordingly, we refer to this point as the 
compliance equilibrium.  As we explore further in this Article, there are 
multiple forces exerted by the regulator and the firm that preclude the 
regulator-firm relationship from achieving a stable compliance 
equilibrium.118
Finally, it bears noting the profile of firms in the inefficient spaces 
behind the frontier.  Firms in the RPa field represent enterprises that over-
invest in compliance relative to their reduction in risk.  Such firms are 
typically bureaucratically heavy enterprises with a conservative attitude 
toward risk.119  Investments in this space may be prominent through the use 
of easily recognizable forms and procedures. However, such process may 
do little to actually reduce risk or do so at an unsustainable cost to 
productivity.  A principal-agent problem may push a firm towards RPa,
such as when managers expend disproportionate resources to preserve 
compliance in order to avoid hurting their own careers for non-compliant 
decisions.  Managers situated in a “don’t stick your neck out” culture are 
incentivized to create overly conservative or cumbersome compliance 
programs in order to avoid personal reputational or liability risk.120
Corporate boards may also overvalue compliance vis-a-vis their firms’ risk-
cost profiles in order to protect their own reputations.121
Firms in the RPb space represent enterprises that underinvest in 
compliance.  Such firms may have a risk attractive culture that encourages 
business gambles for the lure of a high return.  In such firms, a compliance 
department may be understaffed or non-existent.  Lawyers and other 
authorities on regulation may be marginalized due to their perceived 
unimportance.  Managers may have had a negative experience with the 
 118.  See infra Part IV. 
 119.  See Caroline H. Bledsoe et al., Regulating Creativity: Research and Survival in the 
IRB Iron Cage, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 608 (2007) (noting that “managers intentionally 
overestimate risk to create wide margins of safety in order to avoid inefficiency and avert 
costly accidents. Instituted as precautionary measures in the forms of additional rules and 
insistence on strict adherence to the formalized procedures of the organization, these 
margin-of-safety measures, originally intended to ensure that the organization’s goals are 
met, become the overriding concern.”). 
 120.  See Yockey, supra note 55, at 358 (noting the problem of “check the boxes” 
compliance programs caused by static, rigid regulatory requirements).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 98–101. 
 121.  See supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
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legal environment and thus have a negative view on the purpose and goals 
of regulation.122  This may create a culture where, while compliance issues 
are widely known, few take responsibility for managing the compliance 
function.
IV. THE CHOICE OF REGULATORY RULES AND THE IMPACT OF 
REGULATOR OVERSIGHT ON FIRM RESPONSES TO 
REGULATION
The EIR model can be used to analyze how regulators and regulated 
firms interact.  Regulators are interested in achieving specific policy goals, 
and ideally would prefer that all firms achieve perfect compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. Regulators use a number of different 
kinds of legal authority to encourage firms to comply with a rule, thus 
shifting firms away from a high risk of non-compliance (such as TEi) and 
toward a low risk of non-compliance (shifting leftward on the x-axis).  The 
ex ante choice of rule affects how firms comply and the dynamic nature of 
the regulator-firm relationship over time. 
The following discussion begins by defining the three major 
categories of regulatory mandates.  Then it proceeds by examining the 
impact of these different types of rules on firm compliance, the regulator’s 
relationship with the firm, and the achievement of regulatory objectives. 
A. Types of Regulatory Rules: Direct, Collaborative, and Market 
Contingent Regulation 
The legal authority that structures the behavior of firms may be 
categorized in three basic archetypes of regulation.  The first type of 
regulatory approach consists of governmental mandates that fall under 
traditional command-and-control regulation, which we collectively refer to 
as “Direct Regulation”.123  Under this rubric, governments use coercive 
powers to mandate the regulated firm’s compliance with statutorily defined 
regulatory objectives through the threat of investigation, civil fines, and 
criminal prosecution.124  Command-and-control regulation operates in a 
top-down manner that relies heavily on active governmental oversight.125
 122.  See Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV.
61, 84 (2011) (explaining various reasons why managers tend to have negative views 
towards the legal environment). 
 123.  Malloy, supra note 26, at 531 n.1 (referring to “direct regulation” or “traditional 
regulation”).
 124.  Id.
 125.  See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1235–36 
(1995) (explaining the characteristics of command-and-control regulation as well as its 
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The second type of regulatory approach consists of various hybrid 
forms of governance in which the regulator leverages its relationship with 
private governance regimes and firm- or industry-based self-regulation.  
Described by various scholars as New Governance,126 reflexive 
regulation,127 responsive regulation,128 co-regulation,129 negotiated 
governance,130 decentered regulation,131 or other related theories,132 we 
collectively refer to them as “Collaborative Regulation” in order to 
distinguish them from the governmentally established forms of Direct 
Regulation. 
Collaborative Regulation is distinguishable from Direct Regulation in 
two ways: the nature of the regulator-regulatee relationship and the tools of 
regulation.  First, Collaborative Regulation is based on ongoing 
deliberation and communication between the regulator and regulated 
firms.133  While Direct Regulation is based on the administrative state as the 
sole locus of power to regulate, Collaborative Regulation is premised on a 
“collaborative, cooperative enterprise of shaping social outcomes through 
negotiation among numerous public and private actors with stakes in those 
outcomes”.134  In a Collaborative Regulation framework, government 
merits). 
 126.  See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (demonstrating 
a shift from formal regulation to the idea of a “New Governance” that combines both public 
and private actors). 
 127.  See Orts, supra note 125; Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239 (1983) (articulating the theory of reflexive law). 
 128.  See IAN AYRES AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3–4 (1992) (exploring how better policy proposals can result 
from working with the symbiotic interaction between state regulation and self-regulation). 
 129.  See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010) (examining how public regulation can encourage 
workplace self-governance). 
 130.  See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 489 n.9 (listing various alternative names). 
 131.  See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2002) 
(noting the various connotations of the term “decentered regulation”). 
 132.  See Kevin Kolben, Dialogic Labor Regulation in the Global Supply Chain, 37 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 425, 430–31 (2015). 
 133.  See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based 
Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2008) (describing a new regulatory 
system with a more interactive role for regulated entities by accepting input from these 
regulated entities). 
 134.  Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry 
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 427 (2011). See Robert F. Weber, New
Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy:  The Example of the 
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 783, 836–37 
(2010) (distinguishing New Governance from command-and-control regulation). 
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regulators share responsibility for achieving policy goals with both firms 
and society generally.135  In many instances, regulatory authority is 
devolved from national governmental agencies to subsidiary bodies and 
civil society actors.136  In a number of prominent cases, Collaborative 
Regulation is the basis for multi-stakeholder initiatives that establish new 
areas of regulation.137  Collaborative Regulation is particularly appealing as 
a means to address transnational regulatory problems—such as 
environmental protection, labor rights, and financial capital flows—where 
governmental regulators and intergovernmental organizations are not able 
to effectively regulate the cross-border activities of multinational 
corporations.138
Second, Collaborative Regulation is defined by the mode of regulation 
itself.  Eschewing the exclusive use of rules, Collaborative Regulation 
often relies on principles-based regulation, which provides the regulator 
with the autonomy to determine what conduct is permissible on the basis of 
an underlying evaluative framework.139  Instead of drawing precise, bright 
line rules between prohibited and permissible conduct, principles-based 
regulation consists of standards that are flexibly applied by regulators in 
different ways depending on the specific factual context.140  Collaborative 
 135.  See Lobel, supra note 126, at 344 (describing the recent shift to a collaborative 
governance model “in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for 
achieving policy goals”). 
 136.  Kolben, supra note 132, at 432. 
 137.  See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and 
Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 457, 471–91 (2004) (analyzing three 
transnational, multi-stakeholder initiatives: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative). 
 138.  Kolben, supra note 132, at 434–35. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: 
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541–45 (2009) 
(identifying the features of transnational New Governance regulatory schemes); Eric J. Pan, 
Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: 
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 262–63 (2010) (describing 
the role of private standard setting bodies in international financial regulation).  See also
Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions: 
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 6–14 (2014) 
(proposing a framework for analyzing the interactions between Collaborative Regulation 
actors).
 139.  See Ford, supra note 133, at 6–7 (describing the difference between rules and 
principles and the scholarly debate surrounding these two concepts). See also Dan Awrey, 
Regulating Financial Innovation:  A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 273, 281–97 (2011) (arguing for more principles-based financial regulation). 
 140.  See Awrey, supra note 139, at 276–78 (describing the differences between rules 
and principles and the advantages and disadvantages of both).  As legal scholars have noted, 
however, this distinction should not be overemphasized.  Any given regulatory system may 
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Regulation-based standards include quantitative indicators, industry 
benchmarks and best practices, and voluntary reporting initiatives.141
The third type of regulatory approach encompasses a range of 
regulatory mandates, including private rights of action, market-leveraging 
taxes, fees, and permits, and mandatory disclosure regimes.142  Unlike 
Direct Regulation, these regulatory approaches do not mandate a specific 
action on the part of regulated firms.  Nor do they necessarily incorporate 
the decentralized, public-private governance of Collaborative Regulation.  
Instead, these forms of “Market Contingent Regulation” seek to influence 
firm behavior by providing incentives or signals to regulated firms.  The 
achievement of the regulator’s objective is contingent on firms responding 
to these incentives or signals. 
Market Contingent Regulation is an interstitial category.  It includes 
parallel forms of regulation that may be categorized either as Direct 
Regulation, Collaborative Regulation, or a hybrid of the two.143  Mandatory 
disclosure—arguably the most important and prevalent regulatory 
technique in the United States—reflects this trait.144  Laws mandating the 
public reporting of a firm’s financial condition and business activities 
include both rules-based and principles-based elements, and any given rule or principle may 
be applied in a manner that belies easy classification. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A
Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, 
Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1417–25 (2007) (analyzing 
the tension in the classification of rules and principles and expressing skepticism about the 
feasibility of describing or designing a principles-based or rules-based system).  See also
Ford, supra note 133, at 9–10 (acknowledging the limitations of the rules-principles 
dichotomy).
 141.  See David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects 
of Achieving Corporate Accountability through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 453–
57 (2007) (analyzing corporate environmental and social reporting as New Governance 
regulation); Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers:  A Case Study of Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575, 590–606 (2013) (analyzing the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), a leading voluntary corporate reporting framework). 
 142.  See Ford, supra note 133, at 26–27, 29–31, 36–40 (describing property-, market-, 
and information-based public regulation). 
 143.  See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental 
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 23–53 (2015) (providing a comparative 
taxonomy of parallel forms of public environmental law and private environmental 
governance); Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus 
Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1669–74 (2015) 
(comparing governmental and private rights of action). 
 144.  Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 652 (2011) (characterizing mandated disclosure as a “favored-weapon in 
the arsenals of legislatures, courts, [and] administrative agencies”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 613, 613 (1999) (calling informational regulation “one of the most striking 
developments in the last generation of American law”).  
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undergird federal banking and securities regulation.145  These laws have a 
coercive, command-and-control element insofar as they require regulated 
firms to disclose information that they otherwise would not voluntarily 
make public.146  On the other hand, the effectiveness of mandatory 
disclosure is contingent on third party users (e.g., customers and investors) 
being able and willing to make use of this information.147  The mandated 
exchange of information between regulated firms and third party users 
through this process is often directly linked to Collaborative Regulation.148
The coerciveness of mandatory disclosure regulation primarily depends on 
two factors: (1) the discretion afforded to a regulated firm to determine 
what to disclose; and (2) the possibility or probability of governmental 
enforcement if the firm fails to disclose.149  In many cases, this 
coerciveness is weak.150
The following figure compares select characteristics of these three 
categories of regulation: 
 145.  See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 144, at 658–59 (claiming that financial 
disclosures are pervasive and reaches all domains of consumer protection); ARCHON FUNG,
MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 107–09 (2007) (arguing that despite the significant political power of 
corporations, mandated financial disclosure requirements have gained more prominence 
over time).
 146.  Ruth Jebe, Sustainability Reporting and New Governance:  South Africa Marks the 
Path to Improved Corporate Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 247 (2015). 
 147.  See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate 
Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 95 (2014) (describing the discretionary reaction of 
firms to stakeholder responses to disclosed information). See also Charlotte S. Alexander, 
Transparency and Transmission: Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market 
Responses to Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 177, 193–95 (2015) (explaining how 
regulators and outside interest groups use information disclosed by firms through 
transparency mandates to enforce labor and employment laws). 
 148.  See David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New 
Governance Regulation:  Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447,
467–73 (2008) (advocating for mandatory social reporting consistent with the GRI 
guidelines); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1301–03 (1999) (suggesting that the SEC 
should supervise social reporting modeled on existing private reporting frameworks and 
industry best principles). 
 149.  See Jebe, supra note 146, at 252–54 (discussing the inadequacies of existing 
mandatory environmental and social disclosure regimes, namely the concept of materiality 
and the weaknesses of enforcement mechanisms).  
 150.  See id. at 253 (citing Sweden and France as examples of mandatory reporting 
systems with weak enforcement mechanisms).  To empower third party users, Aaron Dhir 
has proposed that social disclosure be used to empower corporate shareholders through the 
shareholder proposal mechanism.  Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics of Knowledge 
Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 47, 65–76 (2009). 
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FIGURE 5. COMPARISON OF REGULATORY APPROACHES
B. The Impact of Choice of Rule on Firm Compliance 
The EIR model illuminates the impact of the choice of regulatory rules 
and illustrates the potential interactions between them.  As a business 
regulatory approach, Collaborative Regulation has its greatest potential for 
influence when the firm is at a high-risk state of non-compliance (such as 
TEi).  Collaborative Regulation can help the firm move toward a lower risk 
of non-compliance.  Both the regulator and the firm can benefit from 
collaboration based on Collaborative Regulation principles.  This 
interactive cycle begins with firms signaling their commitment to the 
policy goals of the regulator.  This may be accomplished by making public 
disclosures of firm practices and commitments through self-reporting and 
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self-policing,151 social and environmental reporting,152 active participation 
in stakeholder-based governance regimes,153 and engaging in non-
exploitative behavior toward regulatory mandates.154  Regulators, in turn, 
respond to the firm’s commitment to regulatory goals by allocating 
resources away from the monitoring function and de-escalate toward a non-
confrontational posture.155  The regulator further responds by developing 
partnerships with the firm as well as sharing expertise.  At this point, the 
firm is not only better understanding the goals and attitudes of regulatory 
agency, but also learning how best to comply effectively from the very 
entity that is in charge of enforcing compliance.  This, in turn, can promote 
still further investments in regulatory compliance, which still further 
deepen the relationship of trust, broaden the exchange of information, and 
decrease the costs of monitoring for both sides.156
This self-reinforcing cycle of compliance, relationship building, and 
information exchange creates a state of what is often characterized as meta-
regulation.157  In a meta-regulatory partnership, the government observes 
firm behavior only at a distance, focuses not on monitoring but rather on 
evaluating a firm’s compliance function and controls, and ensures they 
function properly.158  Instead of conformance with rules, regulation 
becomes a means for regulators to encourage firms to implement and 
 151.  See Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does 
Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. ECON. 609, 638–40 
(2011) (finding “evidence that self-reporting can reliably indicate effectively implemented 
self-policing and that regulators are, in fact, using self-reporting to identify firms that are 
meaningfully monitoring their own operations”). 
 152.  See Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach to 
Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 298–302 (2015) (noting the 
role of disclosure regimes in promoting communication of adverse environmental and social 
impacts between firms, regulators, and stakeholders). 
 153.  See id. at 302–06 (describing assessment and feedback mechanisms through public-
private, multi-stakeholder initiatives). 
 154.  Cf. Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 14–15 
(2008) (noting how certain firms exploit textual weaknesses in regulation). 
 155.  This de-escalation is represented by an enforcement pyramid, which illustrates the 
various coercive and persuasive strategies a regulator may utilize to exert a pull to 
compliance over a firm.  These can be weak or strong given the severity of the non-
compliance or strength of the emerging partnership.  Neil Gunningham, Strategizing
Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond, in EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION, supra note 12, at 199, 203. 
 156.  See Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy of Regulation as a 
Function of Psychological Fit:  Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 581, 602 (2011) (noting that “over time, the justice perceptions 
of individuals working together are said to converge”). 
 157.  See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
AND DEMOCRACY 245–91 (2002) (defining and examining the concept of meta-regulation). 
 158.  Gunningham, supra note 155, at 200, 211–16. 
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sustain best practices for their internal compliance controls.159  Regulators 
can also disseminate information about how firms need to comply, as well 
as which strategies are most cost-effective to make compliance happen.  
The regulator can reduce information barriers the firm possesses about 
understanding a regulation and what can be done to efficiently meet the 
regulation’s requirements.  This may result in the creation of new 
Collaborative Regulation-based regimes to enable regulators and firms to 
share information and generate surplus.160  In essence, the regulator can 
inform the regulated firm how to more efficiently comply, and thereby 
lower its risk profile at a greater proportion to the cost of the firm’s 
investment in compliance.  A combination of regulatory interventions 
based on Collaborative Regulation may reinforce each other: the ability of 
regulators and regulated firms to communicate and collaborate leads to 
more contextual, shared understandings of their respective and shared 
policy goals, which are manifested as standards, and vice versa.161
As regulation innovates over time, it is shaped by both regulatory 
objectives and the responses of firms, as well as external stakeholders 
contributing their expertise and expressing their preferences.162  As part of 
this process, regulators often directly involve regulated firms in the process 
of developing the standards to which they are held accountable.163  This 
partnership in governance helps ensure that future compliance standards are 
both efficiently written and substantively effective.  Firms that participate 
in the creation of standards become agents in the regulatory process instead 
of mere subjects of regulation.164  In doing so, firms are motivated to invest 
in internal compliance functions and to view compliance as a means to 
 159.  Id. at 211. 
 160.  Among such measures are informational regulation measures, such as encouraging 
and facilitating the voluntary disclosure of information through New Governance-style 
industry-based reporting mechanisms. See Jamie Darin Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, 
Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
451, 487–91 (2014) (describing industry-level conflict minerals due diligence and reporting 
programs). 
 161.  Awrey, supra note 139, at 288–89. 
 162.  See Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research 
Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 472 (2008) (describing organizations’ inclusion of 
both “maximizing profits and serving the interests of shareholders” when defining corporate 
responsibility).
 163.  See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social Reform of Banking, 39 J.
CORP. L. 459, 474 (2014) (“. . . if people within regulated entities are engaged with 
regulators or representatives of non-government organizations (NGOs) in developing the 
voluntary standards for actions, there is a good possibility of creating greater trust between 
the parties, and a state of shared values and mutual problem-solving that should lead to 
better compliance with the content of the standards.”). 
 164.  Ford, supra note 133, at 30 (“Requiring firms to fill in the content of those 
principles themselves makes firms agents rather than subjects of regulation.”). 
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fulfill underlying principles of responsible business practice, instead of 
merely “cosmetic compliance.”165  Thus, perceiving compliance as a long-
term investment, rather than a one-time cost-benefit decision, can help 
build a partnership between regulator and regulatee that makes present 
compliance more efficient and future regulation more responsive and 
effective.166  In certain circumstances, a Collaborative Regulation-based 
approach to standard-setting can enable norms of compliance to spread 
within a firm167 or among firms through processes of socialization.168
This regulator-regulatee relationship is not only laudable from a policy 
perspective but it may also be efficient from a firm-oriented 
microeconomic perspective.  When the regulator and the firm exhibit trust 
and cooperation towards one another, which is an act foundationally 
characteristic of Collaborative Regulation, each relaxes their posture with 
respect to the compliance function.  Regulators that trust that the enterprise 
is committed to satisfactory compliance practices can spend fewer 
resources monitoring and enforcing rules against the firm.  The firm, in 
turn, under reduced threat of investigation, dedicates fewer resources to 
defending against actual or potential challenges by the regulator against the 
enterprise.  This mutual relaxation of resources, based upon trust, creates a 
resource surplus that both firm and agency can share.169  Regulators benefit 
from this posture because they can allocate their limited monitoring assets 
elsewhere, and can also more readily gather information about the firm’s 
compliance practices.170  Firms benefit from this posture by reducing their 
exposure to external audits, investigations, and penalties.171  In terms of the 
 165.  Id. at 29–30. 
 166.  See, e.g., Fiona Haines, Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions:  A 
Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of Disaster, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 57 (2009) 
(“Newer forms of regulation such as metaregulation can, as demonstrated here, play a 
valuable role in maintaining integrity between regulatory goals, procedures, and site 
practices.”).
 167.  See David E. DePianto, Sticky Compliance:  An Endowment Account of Expressive 
Law, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 327, 336–39 (2014) (describing how the expression of law as 
social norms can promote compliance). 
 168.  See Park, supra note 147, at 117–20 (describing the expressive dimension of 
mandatory social disclosure); see also Ford, supra note 133, at 28 (“The enforcement of 
law, like law itself, serves an expressive purpose. Regulatory approval . . . confers 
legitimacy on firm operations . . . .”).   
 169.  Williams & Conley, supra note 163, at 474 (discussing that regulator-regulatee 
conversation can build trust and understanding).  
 170.  Ford, supra note 133, at 30–31; see Lobel, supra note 126, at 398–99 (describing 
New Governance-style feedback and learning, which helps keep regulation from being 
outdated).
 171.  See Ford, supra note 133, at 34–36 (discussing the benefits of this form of 
regulation, which encourages responsible firms to believe that regulatory actions are not 
arbitrary and their good behavior will be rewarded). 
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EIR model, Collaborative Regulation enables firms to shift leftward along 
the TE compliance curve away from TEb by investing in compliance 
practices that generate risk reduction benefits that outweigh the initial cost.  
In addition to the previously mentioned low-hanging fruit that the firm 
discovers on its own, Collaborative Regulation creates a robust mechanism 
by which firms move toward a more efficient state of compliance. 
C. The Limits of Collaborative Regulation and the Effects of Direct 
Regulation and Market Contingent Regulation 
The effectiveness of Collaborative Regulation as a means of 
compelling firm compliance, however, is inherently limited.  One reason 
that Collaborative Regulation is successful is that it creates a shared surplus 
arising from resource sharing, cooperation, and trust building measures.  
This effect can potentially bring the enterprise to compliance equilibrium, 
(i.e., TEi, AEi) where the firm is both technically and allocatively efficient 
in its compliance practices.  In other words, the firm has achieved the 
greatest risk reduction for the least possible cost.  A firm may move beyond 
compliance equilibrium for a time.  It may be motivated by altruism 
towards the regulatory goal or a values-driven ethical commitment to the 
objectives of the agency that supersedes profit-making.172
The firm may, through legal mechanisms, consolidate a more durable 
commitment to compliance beyond the law.  One prominent avenue is by 
organizing as a social enterprise, which uses revenue-producing 
commercial activity to pursue the common good as its primary purpose.173
This enables an altruistic-minded firm to “lock in” socially minded, values-
based compliance behavior that furthers the regulator’s public goals.174
Statutes recognizing social enterprise companies have been enacted in 
various forms by over one-half of U.S. states.175  Most prominent among 
 172.  See generally Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational 
Motivations for Corporate Giving:  Complementing Economic Theory with Organization 
Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1035 (1997) (discussing reasons for differences in 
corporate giving behavior). 
 173.  J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation:  Delaware’s Public Benefit 
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2014). 
 174.  See Joseph W. Yockey, The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise, 4 MICH. BUS.
& ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 19 (2014) (discussing value-based compliance’s emphasis 
on agents who “intuitively consider every organizational priority when approaching any 
situation” and in turn, “behave responsibly and in the ways the organization prefers . . . .”); 
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 89, 99 (2015) (reviewing legal scholars’ discussions of social enterprise and their 
focus on commitment). 
 175.  Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231, 
232 (2014); see also J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, 
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them is the benefit corporation statute, which has been adopted by twenty-
six states and the District of Columbia.176  Under many of these statutes, a 
social enterprise must include a “mission lock” provision in its charter that 
permits the amendment of the entity’s public benefit or social purpose only 
upon a supermajority vote of shareholders.177  Despite their commitments to 
furthering the public good beyond general business regulation, benefit 
corporations have demonstrated deficiencies in complying with the self-
imposed heightened legal requirements to which they are subject under 
benefit corporation statutes.178
Apart from social enterprises, a firm’s commitment to comply with 
law beyond the compliance equilibrium is often ephemeral, however.  Firm 
ownership or management may change.  Managers may not be certain how 
to address and reconcile competing firm goals and social policy goals.  
There may be differing views among managers, executives, and owners 
qua corporate shareholders concerning who and what should benefit from 
the firm’s altruism.179  Firm management may feel pressured by 
shareholders to optimize compliance costs.180
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2012) 
(discussing benefit corporation, low-profit limited liability company, and flexible purpose 
corporation statutes).  A related, but distinct, organizational strategy is the for-profit 
philanthropic organization. See generally Shruti Rana, Philanthropic Innovation and 
Creative Capitalism:  A Historical and Comparative Perspective on Social 
Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1121 (2013) 
(arguing that for-profit philanthropic organizations are part of a long history of 
philanthropy, and that important philanthropic benefits occur when firms take their business 
innovations and ideas and apply them to philanthropic endeavors). 
 176.  Plerhoples, supra note 174, at 105. 
 177.  Id. at 127.  Connecticut’s benefit corporation statute takes this principle one step 
further by permitting a benefit corporation to adopt a legacy preservation provision in its 
certificate of incorporation.  Once adopted, this provision requires that, upon the firm’s 
dissolution, its assets be distributed either to one or more charitable organizations or other 
benefit corporations that have adopted this provision. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-1355 
(2015).
 178.  See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25 
(2015) (determining that, based on survey data, compliance with benefit corporation 
reporting requirements was below ten percent). 
 179.  One potential way to address this conflict is to require that the corporation include 
an express statement of its corporate objective in the certificate of incorporation. See Justin 
Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the Corporate 
Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 204 (2015) (proposing an amendment to 
corporate law statutes that require “for-profit corporations to include in their certificates of 
incorporation an express statement of the objective(s) they will pursue”). 
 180.  See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations — A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 609 (2011) (noting the prevalence of the 
profit-maximization mindset among corporate fiduciaries); see also Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 768 (2005) 
(arguing that managers have the discretion—but not the legal duty—to sacrifice profit for 
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A firm may also absorb an inefficient compliance position in order to 
sustain the relationship with the regulator.181  Looking to build a long-term 
partnership with an agency, the firm may be willing to absorb temporary 
economic loss but only for a time.  There will likely come a point, 
however, when firm management will perceive the interaction with the 
regulator as a form of advantage-taking and withdraw from a Collaborative 
Regulation-based partnership.  At that point, there is no additional surplus 
to generate and no more information to share.  The firm will not move 
further along the curve toward TEa because it is no longer efficient to do so. 
A regulator may not be satisfied with the firm’s preferred position in 
the EIR model.  This position may still allow for substantial risk of non-
compliance and the attendant failure of the agency to achieve its regulatory 
goals.  If a regulator wants to move the firm past this efficient state, 
whereby the firm will invest more in reducing non-compliance risk at a 
disproportionally greater cost, the effectiveness of regulations based on 
Collaborative Regulation diminishes.  At this point, the shared surplus has 
been distributed, and the regulator is asking the firm to engage in 
inefficient behavior to achieve regulatory goals. 
When this happens, Direct Regulation may take over.  Direct 
Regulation is coercive and punitive, enabling the regulator to exercise 
influence by imposing standards that are backed by sanctions if they are not 
followed.182  Regulatory authority based on command-and-control 
principles can compel firms to engage in more risk reduction behavior that 
is inefficient for them, but furthers the regulatory goals of the agency.  This 
action, however, erodes the possibility for future cooperation, as it denies 
social goals). 
 181.  This behavior is analogous to that described in relational contracts, whereby 
contracting firms pursue value generation over the entire relationship rather than each 
transaction and also expect periodic deviations from value-maximizing behavior as a matter 
of course. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 149, 153 (2005) (discussing how shared experiences and bonds strengthened 
throughout a relationship results in “contracting [that] signifies a commitment to cooperate 
in far more depth than a mere bargained for allocation of risk”); Richard E. Speidel, The
Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823, 828 
(2000) (discussing how an extended duration of a relationship changes the business 
interactions with regards to terms and discretion). 
 182.  See Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633,
659–60 (2012) (pointing to an article defining the standard of Direct Regulation as “the 
exercise of influence by imposing standards backed by . . . sanctions”); Blake C. Norvell, 
Business Regulatory Lessons Learned From Amusement Park Safety Concerns: An 
Integrated Approach to Business Regulation, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 267, 270 
(2008) (“A government that utilizes command and control regulations sets mandatory 
standards and penalizes those who do not comply.  This method utilizes negative 
reinforcement techniques, such as monetary fines for rule violations, as the primary 
mechanism to encourage compliance.”). 
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the environment of trust and shared goals to emerge between firms and 
regulators.183  Compliance programs based solely on Direct Regulation 
often mimic extrinsic, incentive-based regulation, which may crowd out 
ethical norms within the firm by putting a price tag on behaving 
ethically.184
While awareness of the indirect costs of Direct Regulation is growing, 
regulators are nonetheless statutorily mandated to ensure compliance.  The 
question remains, then: why do regulators not simply compel firms through 
Direct Regulation to achieve maximum compliance? Regulators may 
acknowledge the cost of regulation to businesses and may be statutorily 
obligated to do so,185 but ultimately it is the policy objectives of the agency 
that supersede the cost and profit goals of the firms that they regulate. 
This question may be answered by referring to the EIR model.  For 
simplicity, assume that the regulator has no interest in firm costs, is 
responsive to no legal requirement to concern itself with firm costs, and is 
solely concerned with maximizing its regulatory objectives.  In this 
situation, the regulator’s ideal place for the firm is on the x-axis, which 
represents full compliance with the stated regulation.  The regulator is 
indifferent to where the firm would be found on the x-axis, as the regulator 
is indifferent to the cost the firm must bear to achieve this compliance goal.  
More likely, under such conditions, the cost to the firm would be relatively 
high, and thus it may be reasonably assumed that the single-minded 
regulator would likely force firms toward TEa, where compliance is 
complete (or near complete) but accomplished at a very high cost to the 
firm. 
The prevalence of laws based on Market Contingent Regulation 
further complicates the regulator’s ability to compel compliance beyond the 
firm’s compliance equilibrium.  From the perspective of the regulator vis-à-
 183.  Cf. Park & Berger-Walliser, supra note 152, at 307–09 (describing adaptive 
learning by firms of industry best practices and stakeholder impacts through legally 
mediated communication with regulators and other firms). 
 184.  See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 
J. CORP. L. 769, 822–23 (2014) (discussing how incentive-based regulations may promote 
incentives towards illegal behavior). 
 185.  For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires in part that any agency 
promulgating a rule have to certify that the subsequent regulation will not impose significant 
harm on a substantial number of small businesses.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (referencing 
statutes analyzing and describing regulatory functions and procedures regarding small 
businesses).  Agencies that are unable to certify the absence of such significant harm must 
then conduct a more thorough analysis of the rule’s impact and develop potential methods of 
reducing the burden. See Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, Interactive Regulation, 13 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 837, 838 (2011) (discussing relationships established under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act between small business leaders and federal regulators that helped reduce 
administrative burdens facing small businesses). 
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vis a single regulated firm, Market Contingent Regulation introduces three 
unpredictable variables: time, firm responses, and market effects.  Because 
Market Contingent Regulation, for the most part, relies on third party 
market participants to take action (e.g., by responding to disclosed 
information or exercising private rights of action), there is an inherent time 
lag and uncertainty concerning how a regulated firm will respond.186
Further, in some cases, the responses of regulated firms to Market 
Contingent Regulation may lead to unforeseen or undesirable effects on the 
regulated activity until the regulator can modify its rules or policies.187
The regulator is meaningfully constrained from compelling full 
compliance by multiple competing forces that impact regulator-firm 
interactions.  If Collaborative Regulation-based measures fail, regulators 
can compel firms to reach a desired state of risk-cost compliance if they 
have the appropriate legal mandate to exert Direct Regulation or change 
their rules or practices regarding Market Contingent Regulation.  However, 
regulators do not operate in a vacuum and thus are subject to a variety of 
competing push-and-pull forces, which are represented by the arrows in the 
following figure: 
FIGURE 6. REGULATOR AND FIRM FORCES IMPACTING COMPLIANCE
 186.  See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 145, at 66–68 (describing how the 
effectiveness of mandatory disclosure rules depends on the value, compatibility, and 
comprehensibility of users’ responses to disclosed information).  
 187.  See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other 
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 510–11 (2007) (examining the market costs of 
mandatory disclosure rules). 
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Figure 6 shows how these competing push-and-pull forces determine 
where a firm falls within the continuum of compliance possibilities.  
Regulators—including independent administrative agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other powerful 
governmental regulators, such as the Federal Reserve—are constrained by 
limited enforcement resources.188  Regulatory agencies often do not have 
sufficient money or manpower to pull all firms towards TEa through
aggressive investigative and enforcement measures.  Agencies must 
accept—sometimes explicitly and other times only implicitly—an 
imperfect “second best” for achieving policy goals and aim for some state 
where systemic non-compliance occurs.189
Furthermore, regulatory agencies are also subjected to political 
pressure.  Firms lobby legislators through corporate political activity, and 
legislators in turn respond to such lobbying by placing pressure on 
administrative agencies to relax their enforcement of stated objectives.190
Legislators backed by political interests can compel agencies to relax their 
enforcement goals even in the presence of an explicit statutory command to 
push firms toward full compliance.191  This, in turn, places further 
downward pressure on regulators to eschew compliance and allows 
possible minor deviations from compliance to go unpunished.  The agency 
instead devotes its limited human and political capital to pursue narrower 
strategic goals, such as investigating repeat violators or deterring certain 
kinds of business conduct.192  This political reality places further pressure 
 188.  See Dylan Hanson, Increased Responsibility, Same (Inadequate) Funding for the 
SEC, CFTC, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11630 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/JQ2A-RKVG] (noting the 
negative impact of Congressional underfunding on regulatory enforcement of the Dodd-
Frank Act). 
 189.  See Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed
Options Trading Prior to M&A Announcements:  Insider Trading? 2, 35 (June 12, 2014), 
www.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Informed-Options-Trading_June-12-
20141.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/786H-SLCR] (finding evidence of insider trading in 
approximately one-quarter of corporate mergers and acquisitions in the sample while 
identifying that the SEC litigated less than five percent of M&A transactions in the sample 
studied).
 190.  See Yockey, supra note 55, at 337–38 (noting corporate lobbying to ease FCPA 
enforcement practices and policies). 
 191.  See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of 
Financial Politics:  A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2044–49 (2014) (describing 
how capture of federal financial regulators led to regulatory non-intervention and active 
deregulation prior to the 2008 financial crisis). 
 192.  See James Sterngold, Preet Bharara: Charging a Firm for Insider-Trading a ‘Rare 
Use of Power’, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (July 17, 2013, 12:12 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/17/preet-bahrara-charging-a-firm-for-insider-
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on the agency to tolerate less than perfect compliance, signaling to firms 
that somewhere further away from TEa is the expected state of compliance.  
Thus, regulators’ preferred state of compliance for firms, taking into 
account resource limitations and political realities, is somewhere between 
TEa and TEi.193
V. SURPASSING THE COMPLIANCE FRONTIER THROUGH RISK-
COST TRANSFORMATION
Corporate compliance hinges on the relationship between regulators 
and regulated firms.  As shown by the EIR model, the mode of this 
relationship is constantly subject to change, depending on the firm’s risk-
cost calculations and the regulator’s policy objectives and resource 
constraints.  There is another dimension to corporate compliance that the 
EIR model sheds light on.  The following discussion explores the ways in 
which firms can improve the efficiency of their responses to regulatory 
mandates without materially increasing the risk of non-compliance. 
A. The Power of Risk-Cost Transformation 
Firms that find themselves on the compliance frontier have reached 
technical efficiency within their particular risk-cost profile.  Risk-averse 
firms will be on a line closer to TEa while risk aggressive firms will fall 
closer to TEb.  Firms that have found both technical and allocative 
efficiency will reach compliance equilibrium at TEi, AEi: the most efficient 
point in the space of bounded compliance. 
Firms in highly regulated industries have ramped up the hiring of 
compliance officers and enhanced compliance-related information 
technology.194  This “arms race” in compliance, however, has a finite 
capacity to improve compliance outcomes.  The firm’s allocation of 
trading-a-rare-use-of-power [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LYS8-H4ZL] (quoting Preet Bharara, U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as saying that charging a company is a 
“rare use of power” but one that can be used in some cases “particularly where you have 
malfeasance over a long period of time”). 
 193.  Note that, although we are using movement on the productivity frontier curve to 
highlight these forces, it is not necessary for firms to reach technical efficiency (i.e., falling 
on the curve by reaching the outer bounds of the compliance frontier) for this effect to 
happen.  Sub-efficient firms and sub-efficient regulators, can operate in a space above and to 
the right of the curve in the same fashion without reaching the compliance frontier, and have 
the same results. 
 194.  See, e.g., Annual Report 2014, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 23–24 (2014), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/annual-report/2014/ar-downloads.htm 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5JJW-DWLP] (disclosing deployment of compliance-oriented resources 
to comply with applicable financial regulations). 
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resources to compliance is limited by its willingness and ability to divert 
capital investments away from other corporate objectives.195  Due to the 
resource constraints depicted in the EIR model, a firm must find ways to 
increase its compliance capability (i.e., reduce the risk of non-compliance) 
per unit of compliance-specific resources that it invests.196  In a regulatory 
environment in which the absolute size of the largest firms, the complexity 
of regulatory frameworks, and the opaqueness of firm decision-making all 
continue to increase, a compliance program based on internal enforcement 
of regulatory mandates is not adequate.  Individual employees must have 
the willingness and ability to self-impose constraints on illegal conduct, not 
just respond to external sanctions.197  Just as how ethical decision-making is 
a critical component of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the firm’s 
commitment to social goals, ethical development is often necessary to 
ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.198
But what if the compliance frontier can be expanded? A firm may find 
new ways to improve its compliance profile, which may open up a new 
curve, and result in a new series of risk-cost combinations.  Such 
innovative firms push back the compliance frontier toward a new level of 
innovation.  This new and uncharted frontier can generate one of the most 
sought after assets for an enterprise: a competitive advantage that is not 
easily imitable by rivals.199  The expression of this new frontier in the EIR 
model is evident in the following figure: 
 195.  See SIFMA Compliance White Paper, supra note 31, at 22–24 (noting the very 
high costs and limited resources available for designing and staffing compliance 
surveillance).
 196.  See Malloy, supra note 26, at 585 (observing that firms prefer allocating capital to 
strategically oriented projects vis-à-vis proposed regulatory investments driven by cost 
reduction).
 197.  See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference: Reforming Culture 
and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141020a.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/WL5Y-EJ6U] (discussing how compliance systems management and 
regulators put in place to monitor and shape behavior is a work in progress). 
 198.  See Leslie E. Sekerka, Compliance as a Subtle Precursor to Ethical Corrosion:  A 
Strength-based Approach as a Way Forward, 12 WYO. L. REV. 277, 278 (2012) (noting the 
difficulty that employees face in acting ethically due to the complexity of the issues and the 
pressure of short-term organizational goals such as profit). 
 199.  See Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J.
MGMT. 99, 102 (1991) (defining competitive advantage as the implementation of a value-
creating strategy “not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors”); see generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING
AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985) (describing how firms create competitive 
advantage).
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FIGURE 7. CREATING A NEW COMPLIANCE FRONTIER 
THROUGH RISK-COST TRANSFORMATION
As shown in Figure 7, this “risk-cost transformation” approach 
involves measures undertaken by the firm that shift its compliance curve 
downward toward the productivity frontier, thus enabling it to comply with 
regulation more efficiently.  Reflecting this shift, the firm’s compliance 
equilibrium moves down and to the left, reflecting a net improvement in its 
technical efficiency per unit of investment in compliance. 
B. Methods of Risk-Cost Transformation 
Risk-cost transformation of the corporate compliance function is 
accomplished through two distinct methods.  Firms can seek to enhance the 
capacity either of individual firm employees or firm management as a 
whole to manage compliance.  While the former focuses on improving 
individual decision-making by employees within the firm, the latter focuses 
on firm-wide internal governance.  We briefly highlight the relevant 
aspects of each of these compliance-enhancing methods by reference to the 
EIR model. 
To achieve risk-cost transformation by enhancing individual decision-
making capacity, a widely recognized approach is to change the firm’s 
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corporate culture in order to make it more conducive to compliance.200
Lynn Sharp Paine’s formative research on organizational integrity focuses 
on establishing legitimacy with employees through the development of 
organizational values.201  A culture of integrity, when implemented in a 
manner that calibrates the firm’s risk appetite with its institutional capacity, 
not only motivates individual employees to act ethically, but just as 
importantly, equips them with the analytical tools and mindset to identify 
breaches of compliance.202  Firms in a range of industries have established 
corporate integrity systems and, in many cases, have integrated them into 
their compliance functions.203  In many cases, the attitude of managers, 
corporate executives, and other firm leaders towards ethics has an outsize 
impact on ethical behavior throughout the organization.204  A “tone at the 
top” established by senior management and the board of directors is critical 
to ensuring corporate integrity and deterring fraud.205
 200.  Corporate culture may be defined as “the set of shared beliefs and norms [within 
the corporation] that tells people how to act when there are no formal rules.”  René M. Stulz, 
Risk-Taking and Risk Management by Banks, 27 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2015). 
 201.  Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV.
106, 111 (1994). See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1791–95 (2007) (citing and 
describing scholarly research and industry studies on the impact of integrity-based 
programs). 
 202.  See Bird & Park, supra note 51, at 234–38 (describing how a culture of integrity 
promotes compliance); see also Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, 
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Compliance – Some Thoughts About Reaching the Next Level, 
Remarks at the Fordham Journal of Corporate Counsel & Financial Law Symposium (Feb. 
9, 2015), http://www.bis.org/review/r150210c.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/BF5X-MHBD] (citing 
research finding that compliance programs integrating values-based ethics training are more 
effective in promoting compliance). 
 203.  See DeStefano, supra note 7, at 95–96 (noting how the compliance function has 
evolved to integrate ethics training); SIFMA Compliance White Paper, supra note 31, at 27 
(noting the split between firms with a combined ethics/compliance function versus firms 
with separate ethics and compliance functions). 
 204.  See Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for 
Designing Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 51 (2012) (noting studies 
indicating that the attitude of managers plays a pivotal role in shaping the ethical conduct of 
employees, such as reporting misconduct). 
 205.  Bradley Lail et al., The Influence of Regulatory Approach on Tone at the Top, 126 
J. BUS. ETHICS 25, 26 (2015) (defining tone at the top as “the standard set by the 
organization’s leadership whereby performance is measured; the culture within which the 
members of the organization operate; the tone set by senior management; irrespective of 
management’s documented strategy and policies, it is the force that drives individual 
professionals; the “unseen hand” that directs activities regardless of management’s 
proximity to the action; and a commitment to the quality of care clients receive.”) (quoting
Tone at the Top and Audit Quality, INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS 8 (Dec. 2007), 
http://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/tone-at-the-top-and-audit-q.pdf) 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9KWG-3C89])). 
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Integrity-based approaches to compliance are not infallible, however.  
Ethics programs integrated into the compliance function are often resource-
intensive and require customized systems for firms in different industries, 
legal jurisdictions, and cultural environments.206  The impact of integrity-
building can be difficult to measure207 and, according to some critics, do 
not have a material impact on compliance.208  Furthermore, the payoff from 
integrity-based approaches may not be uniform across the firm. 
Another method of risk-cost transformation can be achieved through 
enterprise risk management (ERM).  ERM is a practice “designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be 
within its risk appetite, [and] to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives.”209  This includes compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations.210  ERM enables a firm to more effectively 
identify and mitigate compliance risk in relation to other risks, rather than 
in isolation.211  ERM views all sources and effects of risk as parts of an 
integrated, strategic, and enterprise-wide system.212  In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent enactment of the Dodd-Frank 
Act in 2010, there is now far greater scrutiny on the relationship between 
 206.  See Managing Global Ethics and Compliance as an Asset, Not an Expense, WALL
ST. J. RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/ 
riskandcompliance/2014/12/04/managing-global-ethics-and-compliance-as-an-asset-not-an-
expense [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/H8EQ-XETK] (noting the ethics and compliance challenges that 
U.S. companies face when expanding into emerging markets). 
 207.  See Stulz, supra note 200, at 16 (“There is little empirical work on the relation 
between culture and corporate outcomes, in large part because of the difficulty of measuring 
the dimensions of culture.”). 
 208.  See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 510–15 (citing empirical studies on codes of ethics, 
organizational compliance structures, and diversity training to argue that compliance 
programs are ineffective as a means to reduce socially harmful conduct). 
 209.  Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework, COMM. OF SPONSORING
ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N 2 (2004), http://www.coso.org/ 
documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/736M-23C3]. 
 210.  Id. at 3. 
 211.  See Martin F. Grace, J. Tyler Leverty, Richard D. Phillips & Prakash Shimpi, The
Value of Investing in Enterprise Risk Management, 82 J. RISK & INS. 289, 290 (2015) 
(describing ERM as “a holistic approach to risk management . . . [where] a firm examines 
risks jointly, assessing the interaction of each risk with the firm’s portfolio of other 
important risks”). Firms face a multitude of risks, including financial risks (such as credit, 
liquidity, and market risk), strategic risk, reputational risk, and various sources of 
operational risks.  MILLER, supra note 1, at 539–41.  Compliance risk is often categorized as 
a component of operational risk. See Risk Management Practices and Regulatory Capital – 
Cross-Sectoral Comparison, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION 23 (Nov. 2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/joint04.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/
VKB6-Q8BS] (noting that operational risks include legal and compliance-related risks). 
 212.  Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and 
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 581 (2008). 
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corporate governance, risk management, and compliance.213
ERM facilitates firm-wide regulatory compliance in two interrelated 
ways.  First, the integration of compliance with ERM enables a firm to 
identify the range of risks across the firm resulting from inadequate 
compliance.  In many firms, the effectiveness of compliance is hindered by 
a compliance function that segregates responsibility within the firm based 
on the functions or units that are subject to regulation, the government 
agency that has regulatory authority, or the country in which regulation is 
being applied.214  Compliance risk may lead to damage to a firm’s brand or 
a loss of customer confidence that has adverse financial, business, and 
reputational impacts that go beyond the costs of regulatory enforcement 
actions or civil suits.215  ERM-based compliance is particularly useful to 
address multi-jurisdictional regulatory mandates and overlapping legal and 
CSR obligations.216
Second, ERM-influenced compliance aims to improve effective 
communication channels among different business units and between 
business units and senior management and the board of directors.217  By 
requiring unit-level managers within the firm to assess risk holistically and 
report these assessments up the ladder, the firm’s decision-makers are able 
 213.  See Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise 
Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 51 (2009) (noting that 
“UBS revamped its risk management structure” and “increased the emphasis on risk 
reporting” in response to the financial crisis); Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible 
Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP L.
121, 123 (2011) (finding that large bank holding companies substantially modified their 
corporate governance policies by augmenting board oversight of risk management in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis); Paul Rose, Regulating Risk by “Strengthening Corporate 
Governance,” 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (describing a link between risk management 
and corporate governance and how these failures contributed to the financial crisis). See
also MILLER, supra note 1, at 1 (declaring governance, risk management, and compliance 
“in vogue”). 
 214.  See The Risk Intelligent Enterprise, DELOITTE supra note 56, at 8 (describing the 
tendency of organizations to separate into “silos” based on geography or business function).  
Silos can also occur within corporate departments as well as between them. 
 215.  Compliance Risk Assessments, DELOITTE 4 (2015), http://www2.deloitte.com/ 
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aers-compliance%20riskassessments-
02192015.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9T7E-WJQ8]. 
 216.  Demystifying Sustainability Risk: Integrating the Triple Bottom Line Into an 
Enterprise Risk Management Program, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY
COMM’N 5–6 (May 2013), http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO-ERM%20 
Demystifying%20Sustainability%20Risk_Full%20WEB.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2R5U-
LKYJ] (describing global environmental and non-financial reporting risks).  See also Bird & 
Park, supra note 51, at 230 (referring to ethical and social mandates whose legal status may 
be uncertain or contested). 
 217.  See Harner, supra note 92, at 1334 (noting the importance of effective 
communication and the free flow of information regarding risk assessment). 
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to identify firm-wide trends, patterns, and inconsistencies across the firm’s 
various compliance-related activities.218  For purposes of analytical clarity, 
the EIR model conceptualizes the response of a firm to a single regulatory 
mandate.  Of course, in reality, corporate compliance is multimodal: any 
given firm must simultaneously manage compliance with a range of 
distinct, but sometimes overlapping, regulatory requirements.  Through an 
enterprise-wide assessment of its responses to all regulatory mandates, a 
firm can capture aggregate efficiency gains by identifying compliance 
strategies that address multiple legal obligations or even strategic 
opportunities outside of compliance.219
While potentially transformative, ERM is not a panacea for 
compliance challenges.  First and foremost, there is a danger in simply 
equating compliance and risk management.  While risk and compliance 
functions are interrelated,220 they do not necessarily implicate the same 
level of legal scrutiny.221  Contrary to binary conceptions of compliance, 
the EIR model shows that firms can make tradeoffs between compliance 
risk and other business investments.  However, the nature and scope of 
these tradeoffs are not as visible nor as value-enhancing as comparable 
tradeoffs involving other forms of risk.  Expected returns from greater risk-
taking are higher in respect of other types of risk.222  Firms that view non-
compliance risk-taking as equivalent to compliance run the risk of 
encumbering the ability of business units to take advantage of opportunities 
to increase firm value by assuming greater risk.223  Further, subsuming the 
 218.  See Harner, supra note 213, at 55 (“Thinking about ERM solely as a monitoring 
process undercuts its potential value. . . . But equally important is the information targeted 
by the system and transmitted to the board.”). 
 219.  See Malloy, supra note 26, at 603 (describing how compliance may be inhibited by 
inconsistent incentives between operational managers and compliance officers and by 
ineffective communication channels between them). 
 220.  See Carlo V. di Florio, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, 
Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at NSCP National Meeting: The Role of Compliance and 
Ethics in Risk Management (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2011/spch101711cvd.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/C9Z7-T4FL] (differentiating 
compliance, ethics, and risk management). 
 221.  See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at 
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 100 (2010) (discussing the relationship between 
oversight liability and risk management practices); Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to 
Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153, 1158–1160 (2010) (criticizing the 
application of Caremark oversight liability to risk management); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 97, at 984 (“Just as the business judgment rule insulates risk taking from judicial 
review, so Caremark should insulate risk management from judicial review.”). 
 222.  See Stulz, supra note 200, at 15. 
 223.  Id. (describing the tradeoffs between risk management and expected return such as 
when an inflexible risk management structure impedes firms’ abilities to take advantage of 
business opportunities). 
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compliance function into ERM—such as, for example, involving the Chief 
Risk Officer in the reporting of compliance to the CEO or the board—may 
lower the stature and perceived importance of compliance within the 
firm.224
CONCLUSION
Compliance is an increasingly complex and diverse area of legal and 
business activity.  A growing array of regulatory mandates and modes of 
regulatory enforcement and an increasing number of firms and jurisdictions 
have spurred interest among legal scholars, practicing lawyers, and 
compliance professionals alike.  This Article seeks to distill the process of 
compliance by focusing on the risk-cost tradeoffs that guide the 
interactions of firms with regulators.  The insights from the EIR model 
shed new light on corporate governance debates in various areas of law.  
By showing how different forms and approaches to regulation affect 
compliance, our model suggests that the effectiveness of business 
regulation as a form of social ordering heavily depends on how it shapes 
firm-derived incentives. 
This Article highlights the central role of regulators in helping firms 
achieve risk-intelligent compliance that optimizes investments in 
compliance made by both regulators and regulated firms.  While business 
regulation and the business of corporate compliance continue to grow, it is 
unrealistic to assume that regulators have unlimited resources and dubious 
to argue that regulators should have infinite power.  Instead, in light of the 
limited capacity of regulators to compel firms to maximize compliance 
(i.e., occupy the upper left quadrant of the EIR model), regulators and 
policymakers must find more innovative ways to achieve the public policy 
goals of regulation.  The EIR model suggests that regulators should be 
more cognizant of the mix of Direct Regulation, Collaborative Regulation, 
and Market Contingent Regulation that they use vis-à-vis any given firm or 
industry.  For certain regulations where the societal costs of firm non-
compliance are relatively high, this observation may lend support for more 
stringent regulation—either in the form of greater use of Direct Regulation 
or increased incentives to third parties for Market Contingent Regulation—
in order to flatten the left tail of firms’ individual compliance curves and 
thus decrease the ratio of compliance investment over non-compliance risk.  
In many other cases, regulators and firms would benefit from collaboration 
 224.  Michael A. Dawson, Integrating Compliance Risk Management into Enterprise 
Risk Management, 21 BANK ACCOUNTING & FIN. 30, 33 (2008). See also Malloy, supra
note 26, at 580–82 (noting how capital allocation within firms is driven by the relative 
influence of certain units and their perceived strategic importance). 
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to enable more self-aware compliance decisions by firms.  Firms stand to 
benefit from determining the shape of their compliance curves and the 
location of their compliance equilibria.  Regulators stand to benefit from 
thinking about regulation in smarter, more subtle ways.  The theoretical 
insights of this Article provide a conceptual framework for improving firm 
effectiveness and guiding regulatory reform. 
